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Abstract
The idea of a flat tax, a tax levied at a single rate, has become an increasingly discussed and implemented fiscal
strategy across Europe and the rest of the world. Estonia, Latvia, and Lithuania adopted flat tax systems in
1994 and 1995, making them the first modern countries to adopt flat tax structures. They subsequently
experienced unprecedented economic growth, shocking the world as they emerged as “Baltic Tigers” at the
turn of the century. Russia adopted a flat tax regime in 2001, and more than a dozen countries currently
maintain some sort of flat tax structure today. However, the actual effect of the flat tax rate on the Baltic
countries’ economic growth remains debated.
Though there is clearly timing a correlation between the Baltic States’ economic growth and the
implementation of the flat tax, the current economic analysis on the effect of the flat tax rate is largely confined
to Russia. Additional research and analysis needs to be completed before determining whether the success of
the “Baltic Tigers” can, and if so, to what extent, be attributed to their flat tax policies. The Baltic States are an
appropriate laboratory for a number of reasons: they have the longest history for examination, and have many
similarities between them including, economy, geographical location, and relationship to Europe. These
similarities allow the analysis to control for unique factors in the individual countries and isolate the effect of a
flat tax.
Looking at revenue, GDP, and labor supply data, this paper attempts to analyze the effect of the flat tax on
these three Baltic states. Using the analysis on these countries, this paper attempts to discuss whether a flat tax
rate is an effective and potent growth strategy for transitional economies. The findings of these analyses do not
indicate that the flat tax has any definitive positive impact on growth, equity, or labor supply. However,
without the simplicity of the flat tax such growth may not have been able to occur in the early years of the
Baltic states’ independence.
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Abstract 
 
The idea of a flat tax, a tax levied at a single rate, has become an increasingly 
discussed and implemented fiscal strategy across Europe and the rest of the world. 
Estonia, Latvia, and Lithuania adopted flat tax systems in 1994 and 1995, making them 
the first modern countries to adopt flat tax structures. They subsequently experienced 
unprecedented economic growth, shocking the world as they emerged as “Baltic Tigers” 
at the turn of the century. Russia adopted a flat tax regime in 2001, and more than a 
dozen countries currently maintain some sort of flat tax structure today. However, the 
actual effect of the flat tax rate on the Baltic countries’ economic growth remains 
debated.  
Though there is clearly timing a correlation between the Baltic States’ economic 
growth and the implementation of the flat tax, the current economic analysis on the effect 
of the flat tax rate is largely confined to Russia. Additional research and analysis needs to 
be completed before determining whether the success of the “Baltic Tigers” can, and if 
so, to what extent, be attributed to their flat tax policies. The Baltic States are an 
appropriate laboratory for a number of reasons: they have the longest history for 
examination, and have many similarities between them including, economy, geographical 
location, and relationship to Europe. These similarities allow the analysis to control for 
unique factors in the individual countries and isolate the effect of a flat tax.  
Looking at revenue, GDP, and labor supply data, this paper attempts to analyze 
the effect of the flat tax on these three Baltic states. Using the analysis on these countries, 
this paper attempts to discuss whether a flat tax rate is an effective and potent growth 
strategy for transitional economies. The findings of these analyses do not indicate that the 
flat tax has any definitive positive impact on growth, equity, or labor supply. However, 
without the simplicity of the flat tax such growth may not have been able to occur in the 
early years of the Baltic states’ independence. 
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Introduction: Flat Taxes in the Baltic States 
 
Following the collapse of the Soviet Union, a period of transition and 
privatization began across Eastern and Central Europe. During this time, fiscal strategy 
was not at the forefront of policy discussions. Initially, all newly independent countries 
inherited the tax system used by the Soviet Union.1 This Soviet style tax system included 
turnover and enterprise profit taxes and was generally inefficient under the newly 
liberalized and privatized economies.2 Thus, as these countries began to transition into a 
market economy and a private sector emerged, the creation of new tax laws became 
increasingly necessary.3  
Beginning with Estonia’s flat tax reform, tax policies in transitional economies 
began to receive increasing attention.4 Estonia adopted a flat tax rate in 1994, followed by 
Lithuania in 1994 and Latvia in 1995.5 Since the Baltic states’ adoption, other Central 
and Eastern European countries have followed, including the Russian Federation in 2001, 
the Slovak Republic and Ukraine in 2004, and Georgia and Romania in 2005.6 The 
publicity from the flat tax reforms has generated debate in other transitional economies 
including Poland, Slovenia, Hungary and the Czech Republic.7  
The flat taxes of the Baltic states—Estonia, Latvia, and Lithuania—do not follow 
the exact model laid out by Robert Hall and Alvin Rabushka or Steve Forbes in the works 
                                                 
1 Emil, et al., Tax Reform in the Baltics, Russia, and Other Countries of the Former Soviet Union. 
Washington DC: International Monetary Fund, 1999, p. 1. 
2 Stepanyan, Vahram, “Reforming Tax Systems: Experience of the Baltics, Russia, and Other Countries of 
the Former Soviet Union.” Washington DC: International Monteary Fund, 2003, p. 12. 
3 Emil, et al., p. 1.  
4 Saavedra, Pablo, “Flat Income Tax Reforms,” Washington DC: The World Bank, 2007, p. 254. 
5 Ibid, p. 256. 
6 Ibid, p. 255. 
7 Ibid, p. 253. 
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The Flat Tax
8 and Flat Tax Revolution.9 A pure flat tax system has not yet been 
integrated in any country thus far,10 and the idea of a “flat tax” has come to be used much 
more loosely than the Hall and Rabushka sense. Today it generally refers only to a single 
marginal tax rate11 on income earned.12 The primary difference between the theoretical 
Hall and Rabushka flat tax and the current structure in the Baltic states is that in addition 
to a personal income and corporate tax rate, all three countries continue to have value-
added taxes (VAT), whose rates vary between 5 and 18 percent. Additionally, the reforms 
introduced tax-free allowances or deductions which add some progressive elements to the 
system.13 The allowance is generally a minimum income below which individuals are not 
taxed.14 The flat tax countries have also introduced social contributions,15 which account 
for a significant part of revenue.16 However, the three countries are still considered to be 
flat tax regimes because they operate predominantly single tax systems under which 
nearly every citizen, regardless of income earned, pays the same marginal tax rate.17 
                                                 
8 Hall, Robert E. and Alvin Rabushka, The Flat Tax. Stanford: Hoover Institution Press, 2007.  
9 Forbes, Steve. Flat Tax Revolution:Using a Postcard to Abolish the IRS. Washington, D.C: Regnery 
Publishing, Inc. 2005.  
10 Ministry of Finance, Czech Republic. “Macroeconomic Outlook: Fiscal Outlook: Topic 4, Flat tax in 
Practice.” Czech Republic: 2009.  
11 Marginal tax rate refers to marginal tax rate is the tax rate that applies to the taxpayer’s last dollar of 
taxable income. (http://www.fairtax.org/PDF/WhatIsTheDifferenceBetweenTaxRates.pdf) 
12 Keen, Michael; Kim, Yitae, and Ricardo Varsano. “The ‘Flat Tax(es)’: Principles and Evidence.” IMF 
Working Paper No. 06/218. International Monetary Fund, September 2006, p. 714. 
13 Saavedra, p. 258. 
14 Ibid, p. 258. 
15 Social contributions include social security contributions by employees, employers, and self-employed 
individuals, as well as other contributions to social insurance schemes operated by governments 
(nationmaster.com). 
16 Keen, p. 714. 
17 Murphy, Richard. “A Flat Tax for the UK? The Implications of Simplification.” ACCA, p. 21. 
Deena Greenberg Page 3 3/24/2009 
Table 1. Current flat taxes (rates in percent) 
  Personal income tax rates  Corporate income tax rate  
Country 
Flat tax 
adopted Before
(a)
 After
(a)
 2007  Before
(a)
 After
(a)
 2007 Basic allowance 
Estonia 1994 16-33 26 22
(b)
 35 26 22
(c)
 Modest increase 
Lithuania 1994 18-33 33 27
(d)
 29 29 15 Substantial increase 
Latvia 1997 25 and 10 25 25 25 25 15 Slight reduction 
Russia 2001 12-30 13 13 30 35 24 Modest increase 
Ukraine 2004 10-40 13 15 30 25 25
(e)
 Increase 
Slovak Rep. 2004 10-38 19 19 25 19 19 Substantial increase 
Georia 2005 12-20 12 12 20 20 20 Eliminated 
Romania 2005 18-40 16 16 25 16 16 Increase 
          
(a) Rates relate to year before and after adoption of the flat tax 
(b) Rate reductions planned, to 20% in 2009, 19% in 2010, and 18% from 2011 
(c) Tax on distributed profits only since 2000. Rate planned to be reduced in step with the personal income tax rate 
(d) Rate planned to be 24% from 2008 
(e) Rate reductions planned, to 22% in 2010 and 20% in 2012 are planned 
Source:  Keen et al., 716 
 
 
Table 2. Tax Structures in the Baltic Countries 
Country 
Savings 
Taxed 
Pensions 
Taxed 
Oversees 
Earnings 
Taxed 
Capital 
Gains 
Taxed 
Inheritence 
Tax 
Other Tax 
Deductions 
and Reliefs 
Estonia  Mainly  Mainly X X 
Latvia  Some     
Lithuania  X   X  
 
Source:  Murphy, Richard. “A Flat Tax for the UK? The Implications of Simplification.” ACCA, p. 22. 
 
Looking at these tax rates, Alvin Rabushka, co-author of The Flat Tax, noted that “all of 
these countries are flat tax regimes in the sense that there’s only one marginal rate of tax 
above the threshold. None of them meet 100% of the criterion of the [Hall and Rabushka 
framework]… but in every case they are better than what they replaced.”18 In each 
country, the new tax system, while not entirely flat, created a less progressive tax scheme 
than the one it followed.  
                                                 
18 ACCA, p. 23. The Baltic countries, like other transitional economies, inherited a Soviet style tax system, 
which included turnover and enterprise profit taxes. These did not operate efficiently under privatization. 
(Stepanyan, p.12) In almost all transitional economies, the tax reform included the abolishment of the 
enterprise profit and turnover taxes and the introduction of a personal income tax, enterprise tax, and a 
value added tax. (Stepanyan, p.12)  
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 While prior to the flat tax implementation all three states were suffering from 
inefficiency and economic stagnation,19 the three experienced unprecedented growth 
following the tax reform. When Estonia’s prime minister Mart Laar established a 26 
percent flat tax on business and personal income in 1994, Estonia’s economy was 
contracting.20 With the flat tax, Estonia established personal exemptions of about $1000 a 
year.21 The tax rate has since been reduced to 22 percent, and is scheduled to be reduced 
to 18 percent by 2011.22 Since the implementation of the tax reforms, Estonia has 
experienced an average growth of 9 percent each year after adjusting for inflation.23 With 
a population of 1.4 million people, it attracted $890 million in foreign direct investment 
in 2003 and $926 million in 2004, more than 10 times what China, with a population of 
more than 1.2 billion, received.24 
 Lithuania and Latvia also experienced tremendous turnaround following the 
establishment of their flat tax rates. Lithuania emerged as the fastest growing economy in 
the Baltics, with a 6.7 percent growth rate in 2002, 9 percent in 2003, and 8 percent in 
2004.25 Latvia has experienced an average growth rate of about 4 percent a year since the 
flat tax, and its inflation, which was 25 percent in 1995 was down to less than 4 percent 
by 2003.26  
 However, controversy remains as to whether or not the success of the Baltic 
Tigers can be attributed to the flat tax system, as well as about the effectiveness of flat 
                                                 
19 Shen, Raphael. Restructuring the Baltic Economies: Disengaging Fifty Years of Integration with the 
USSR. Westport, CT: Praeger Publishers, 1994, p. 1.  
20 Forbes, p. 97. 
21 Ibid. p. 96.  
22 Mitchell, Daniel J. “Baltic Beacon.” Wall Street Journal Europe. June 20, 2007.  
23 Ibid. 
24 Forbes, p. 97; cia.gov. 
25 Ibid. p. 98. 
26 Forbes, p. 98. 
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taxes in general. Some scholars and policy makers point to the success in the Baltic 
countries as evidence for a flat tax’s success. In a 2006 IMF paper and in subsequent 
discussions, Michael Keen argues that the effect of the flat tax is generally ambiguous. 
He poses the question not as “whether more countries will adopt a flat tax,” but “as 
whether those that have it will move away from it.”27 Yet, in a 2007 article for The Wall 
Street Journal Europe, the CATO institute’s Daniel Mitchell pointed to Estonia’s success 
with a flat tax, arguing that “the flat tax has helped Estonia become one of the world’s 
fastest growing economies.” Mitchell claims that the lower tax rates and greater 
simplicity have led to a Laffer Curve effect, where tax revenues almost doubled since 
2000, and corporate tax receipts increased by more than three times.28  
Although the flat tax has received much attention in the news and political 
discussions, there has been little analysis examining its effects. There is copious 
economic literature analyzing the effects of tax changes, yet few studies, either 
theoretical or empirical, on the flat tax. Except for Russia and the Slovak Republic, and 
more recently Estonia,29 there appears to be no household level analyses looking at the 
effect of the flat tax. Michael Keen noted that there “is an evident need for studies in 
other flat tax countries along similar lines, and for work, too on the impact of the flat 
tax…”30  
Understanding the actual effect of the flat tax reforms in the Baltic states has 
enormous payoff for the fiscal policy of other transitional economies and countries in 
                                                 
27 Keen, p. 712. 
28 Mitchell 
29 Staehr, Karsten. “Estimates of Employment and Welfare Effects of Personal Labour Income Taxation in 
a Flat-Tax Country: The Case of Estonia.” Estonia: Bank of Estonia, 2008. A discussion of the analysis is 
found in the Estonia chapter. 
30 Keen, p. 741. 
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general. After looking at its neighbors, Russia adopted a 13 percent flat tax in 2001 on 
personal income, making it the first major economy to adopt a flat tax.31 Since then, more 
than a dozen countries both within and outside the former Soviet Union have adopted flat 
taxes.32 Debate ensues between research institutes, scholars, and those in government 
throughout America and Europe about whether a flat tax is an appropriate fiscal policy.33 
The Baltic states were the first to adopt a flat tax, and therefore have the most 
years to examine in looking at its effect. They present three similarly sized countries with 
similar economies and relationships to Europe that experienced unprecedented economic 
growth following the implementation of a flat tax rate. Yet there remains little analysis on 
these countries and the effect of their 1990s fiscal policy and any analysis generally 
yields an inconclusive verdict. This is for several reasons including a lack of household 
level analyses, the tax systems of the countries including some progressive features, and 
the tax changes occurring during a precarious macroeconomic situation where many 
reforms occurred simultaneously. By better understanding the effect of flat taxes in these 
countries on their growth, policy makers can gain deeper insight on fiscal policy and 
growth strategies in the former Soviet Union and transitional economies. This paper 
analyzes the Baltic countries on an individual and aggregate level and discusses whether 
a flat tax rate is an effective and potent growth strategy for transitional economies.  
 
                                                 
31 Ivanova, Anna; Keen, Michael, and Alexander Klemm. “The Russian Flat Tax Reform.” IMF Working 
Paper, International Monetary Fund, January 2005. p. 2. 
32 Forbes 
33 Rabushka, Alvin. “The Flat Tax Gains Momentum.” Stanford: The Hoover Institute, August 3, 2004. 
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Theory of a Flat Tax 
 
 The main architects of modern flat tax theory are Robert Hall, Alvin Rabushka, 
and Steve Forbes. Hall and Rabushka, both of Stanford University and the Hoover 
Institute, first proposed a flat tax in a 1981 Wall Street Journal article. In 1995, they 
published their book, The Flat Tax. Steve Forbes, editor-in-chief of Forbes magazine and 
president and chief executive officer of Forbes Inc. ran in the 1996 and 2000 United 
States Republican presidential primaries with the flat tax serving as a focal point of his 
campaign.34 In 2005, Forbes published a book, Flat Tax Revolution, in which he laid out 
his arguments for a flat tax. 
 The underlying element of a flat tax is that a charge is levied at a uniform 
percentage rate on all transactions liable to the tax. The flat tax can take a number of 
forms, including a tax on all of one’s income levied at a single rate, a tax of a single rate 
levied on some parts of one’s income, and a tax charged on purchases or consumption 
within the economy. This single tax rate means there is a fixed marginal tax rate, not 
necessarily a fixed average tax rate.35  
The principle behind both Hall and Rabushka’s as well as Forbes’ flat tax 
proposals is that people are taxed on their consumption, not on their investment or 
savings. Their tax is levied at a fixed rate on some parts of people’s income. Both plans 
propose doing this through a single income tax and a single corporate business tax.36 Hall 
and Rabushka propose that both wage and business income is taxed at 19 percent,37 while 
                                                 
34 Forbes, p. xvii.  
35 ACCA, p. 9. Marginal tax rate is the rate on the last segment of income earned. The average tax rate is 
the ratio of the amount of taxes paid to taxable income. (Fairtax.org: What is the difference between 
statutory, average, marginal, and effective tax rates?, p. 2).  
36 Hall and Rabushka, p. 90; Forbes, pp. 60, 66. 
37 Hall and Rabushka, p. 83. 
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Forbes suggests that the federal income tax and a corporate tax be levied at 17 percent of 
profits.38 Forbes also suggests generous exemptions for adults and children.39 Both 
proposals eliminate deductions on interest payments40 as well as eliminating taxes on 
dividends and interest payments.41 Additionally, both propose that only domestic 
operations should be taxed.42 
 Hall and Rabushka explain that their tax proposal is in fact a consumption tax or 
tax on spending, as income is taxed once, and investment and sales are not taxed.43 
Therefore, by measuring consumption as income minus investment, citizens would be 
taxed only on their consumption.44 Hall and Rabushka as well as Forbes agree that taxing 
income is preferred to imposing a sales or value-added tax.45 Arguments for this 
preference include that a sales tax would tax the poor, who would be exempt from an 
income tax.46 Forbes also argues that a sales tax or VAT would raise the price of many 
goods and services, devastate the housing market by increasing the price of houses, and 
increase tax avoidance and evasion.47  
 The three primary advantages of a flat tax system, as Hall and Rabushka lay out, 
are increased economic growth, simplicity, and equity. They argue that a flat tax, with a 
single marginal tax rate, will provide increased incentives to work, thus increasing 
entrepreneurial activity, capital formation, and national output.48 Hall and Rabushka also 
                                                 
38 Forbes, pp. 60, 66. 
39 Forbes, p. 60. 
40 Hall and Rabushka, p. 92; Forbes, p. 68. 
41 Hall and Rabushka, p. 92; Forbes, p. 63. 
42 Hall and Rabushka, p. 117; Forbes, p. 69. 
43 Hall and Rabushka, pp. 63, 79, 81. 
44 Ibid.. p. 83. 
45 Hall and Rabushka, p. 81; Forbes, p. 80. 
46 Hall and Rabushka, p. 81. 
47 Forbes, p. 85. 
48 Hall and Rabushka, p. 127. 
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claim that under their flat tax system, interest rates, which are untaxed, will be lowered 
since lenders will no longer be concerned about interest tax and borrowers, no longer 
receiving deductions for interest paid, will be less inclined to borrow.49 They add that by 
lowering the tax rate in a uniform income tax, there will be increased compliance and 
decreased tax avoidance and evasion, thus generating increased tax revenues.50 Forbes 
adds that the tax will incentivize more productive work and additional risk taking.51 The 
additional investment from the flat tax should create wealth, and this creates additional 
government revenue.52 
Furthermore, both tax proposals set forth claim to be “postcard” tax reforms, with 
the tax forms being able to fit on postcards, making tax payments significantly simpler. 
Finally, as Hall and Rabushka argue, the flat tax is equitable as the taxpayer pays taxes in 
direct proportion to his income, with those earning more, paying more.53 Additionally, 
they claim, that by lowering taxes, the government allows increased individual liberty, as 
higher taxes threaten individual freedom.54 
Today, the main discussions surrounding a flat tax include the arguments that a 
flat tax creates simplicity, increased administrative efficiency, as well as greater 
incentives for investment, savings, and labor force participation through lower marginal 
tax burdens.55 In theory, the less a tax rate alters someone’s economic behavior, the more 
efficient it is. Therefore, a tax of the same rate across income levels should theoretically 
                                                 
49 Ibid. p.143. 
50 Ibid. p. 44. 
51 Forbes, p. 71. 
52 Forbes, p. 71. 
53 Hall and Rabushka, p. 41. 
54 Hall and Rabushka, p. 43. 
55 Saavedra, p. 254. 
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alter one’s behavior less and create greater economic efficiency.56 Additionally, 
proponents argue that flat taxes decrease tax arbitrage, in which tax liability is shifted 
from high to low income groups.57  
The idea behind taxation as it relates to labor is that on the supply side, it is 
assumed that taxpayers adjust the labor supply they provide in response to taxation 
changes. 58 As the tax rate rises, if there were no supply side response, government 
revenue would continue to rise linearly, since higher taxes mean higher revenues. 
However, the typical supply response causes labor supply to decrease with an increase in 
tax rate, leading to what is known as the Laffer Effect: a peak and then decline of labor 
supply as tax rates increase.59 Therefore, low tax rates and less progressive tax structures 
may increase the labor supply, especially if it is elastic, particularly among higher income 
individuals. However, flat tax rates can also reduce labor supply among lower income 
individuals if these individuals are not exempted from at least some element of the tax.60  
Equity also plays a part in the discussion surrounding the flat tax. While a main 
argument and motivation for the flat tax has been to create growth and investment, the 
main opposition has been that the flat tax is inequitable; under a flat tax system, taxpayers 
on the same income level all pay the same taxes, the higher income individuals do not 
bear a heavier burden proportionally than low income ones.61 Flat tax proponents argue, 
however, that with the implementation of exemptions, which exempt the lowest level of 
                                                 
56 Ibid. p. 255. 
57 Ibid, p. 255. 
58 Stepanyan, Vahram. “Reforming Tax Systems: Experience of the Baltics, Russia, and Other Countries of 
the Former Soviet Union.” Washington DC: International Monetary Fund, 2003, p. 24. 
59 Laffer, Arthur B. “The Laffer Curve: Past, Present, and Future.” Washington DC: The Heritage 
Foundation, 2004 
60 Saavedra, p. 255. 
61 Saavedra, p. 255. 
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income from paying taxes, and the removal of loopholes, of which the higher income 
people are generally able to take greater advantage, a flat tax actually makes the tax 
structure more equitable.62 
 
                                                 
62 Ibid, p. 255. 
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Literature Review 
 
 The analytical literature on the effect of flat tax rates in the former Soviet Union 
and transitional economies has been largely confined to studies on Russia, and it does not 
agree on the effect of Russia’s flat tax. The existing literature analyzes whether an actual 
role of the flat tax can be demonstrated in affecting Russia’s revenue growth or in 
increasing compliance in tax payments in Russia.  
 In 2003, Sergei Sinelnikov-Mourylev, Said Batkibekov, P. Kadochnikov, and 
Denis Nekipelov of the Institute for Economies in Transition published a paper 
examining the effect of Russia’s 2000 reform to decrease the personal income tax rate.63 
The authors look at the Russian Longitudinal Monitoring Survey (RLMS) and examine 
whether the personal income tax (PIT) base increased more in areas that faced the 
greatest reduction of marginal tax rate. The authors do find a significant effect, and 
attribute about half of the tax revenue gain to the reduction in marginal tax rates.64  
The first major work examining the effect of a flat tax rate, as opposed to only a 
decrease in marginal tax rate, was published in 2005 by Anna Ivanova, Michael Keen, 
and Alexander Klemm for the International Monetary Fund. The authors also look at the 
RLMS throughout pre and post reform periods and build on the work of Sinelnikov-
Murylev et al. by measuring the effect of the tax on revenue, compliance, and labor 
supply using micro-level panel data.65 The authors looked at revenue performance across 
levels of government.66 Although revenue from the personal income tax did increase by 
                                                 
63 Sinelnikov-Mourylev, Sergei; Batkibekov, Said; Kadochnikov, P., and Denis Nekipelov. “Assessment of 
the Results of Personal Income Tax Reform in Russia.” Moscow: Institute for Economies in Transition, 
2003. 
64 Ivanova, Keen, and Klemm, p. 5. 
65 Ibid. p. 5.  
66 Ibid. p. 15. 
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about 25 percent in real terms, revenue from all but three sources significantly increased 
as well, suggesting an underlying cause beyond the change in personal income tax.67 
They use a “differences in differences” methodology to compare individuals who are 
affected by the reform with those relatively unaffected.68 However, they found no 
evidence of a supply-side effect of the flat tax. In fact, they found that Russia received 
lower tax revenues from those affected by the 2001 reform.69 The authors also found 
labor supply changes to be the same for those affected and unaffected by tax reform.70 
However, they did find that compliance increased by about one third, either due to the 
reform itself or accompanying changes in enforcement.71  
 Following this 2005 IMF paper, Michael Keen, Yitae Kim, and Ricardo Varsano 
published a paper for the IMF in 2006 examining the effect of the flat tax.72 Looking at 
data from Russia and Slovakia,73 they find that there is no evidence of a Laffer-type 
response, where revenue is generated as a result of a tax cut. They did find evidence that 
compliance improved in Russia, although, they could not establish a direct link to tax 
reform rather than changes in enforcement occurring around the same time.74 The authors 
also did not find that the flat tax had a direct impact on work incentives. The one study 
that looks at households’ responses to the flat tax examines Russia, and does not find a 
significant impact on work produced.75 
                                                 
67 Ibid. pp. 15-16. 
68 Ibid. p. 23. 
69 Ibid. p. 39. 
70 Ibid. p. 40. 
71 Ibid. p. 1.  
72 Keen, Michael; Kim, Yitae, and Ricardo Varsano. “The ‘Flat Tax(es)’: Principles and Evidence.” IMF 
Working Paper No. 06/218. International Monetary Fund, September 2006.  
73 Keen, Kim, and Varsano, p. 24. 
74 Ibid. p. 36. 
75 Ibid. p. 27. 
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 In 2008, Yuriy Gorodnichenko, Jorge Martinez-Vazquez, and Klara Sabirianova 
Peter for the National Bureau of Economic Research, published a paper examining the 
effect of Russia’s flat tax reform on tax evasion and worker productivity.76 The authors 
also use the 1998 and 2000-2004 rounds of the Russian Longitudinal Monitoring Survey. 
Their approach to evaluating compliance is to examine differences between reported 
consumption and reported income.77 The authors also develop a framework to assess 
deadweight loss from the PIT where there is tax evasion.78  
While Ivanova, Keen, and Klemm’s paper does not separate the effects of 
improved voluntary tax compliance and improved enforcement, the NBER paper 
attempts to do so. They find that tax evasion was reduced most among those who 
experienced the largest decrease in tax rates.79 However, they find that there is no effect 
of tax enforcement policies on compliance and that instead the flat tax reform played a 
significant role in decreasing tax evasion.80 By extension, the authors find that the flat tax 
helped generate greater revenues for Russia in 2001 and the years to follow.81 The 
authors also look at increased productivity as a result of the tax reform and find that the 
increased productivity due to the tax reform is small relative to the tax evasion 
response.82 Thus, the efficiency gain the authors find, though existent, is smaller than 
prior approaches.83  
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One source of potential problems with the 2005 IMF and 2008 NBER papers is 
that their data source, the Russian Longitudinal Monitoring Survey is a voluntary survey, 
meaning the best and worst off people in society are underrepresented. This can be both 
because people are unwilling to disclose their actual income and because they have no 
home, and the RLMS is an address based survey.84 Additionally, the data used in 
analyzing Russia is affected by the country’s increasingly valuable energy resources, with 
natural gas prices reaching a peak in 2001.85 The authors of the 2005 IMF paper reject the 
idea that energy prices alone could have contributed to the increase in personal income 
tax revenue.86 However, the presence of this variable invites research in other countries 
without such a confounding effect. Finally, the existing literature looks at a relatively 
short time span (since 2001), and examining countries with longer time elapsed since 
reform can be useful in understanding the effect of flat taxes. 
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Methodology 
 
The existing literature measures tax revenue, compliance, and labor supply, 
primarily focusing on Russian data and surveys. In order to more effectively understand 
the effect of the flat tax on transitional economies in general, and on the Baltic countries 
in particular, this work attempts to expand the base and scope of existing analysis. The 
first approach will be to examine the flat tax in each of the Baltic countries: the 
background and reasons for implementation as well as the effect of the flat tax and the 
discussion surrounding it.  
The country level analysis for Estonia and Latvia will primarily focus on the 
effect of the flat tax on labor supply. The analysis for Estonia is from a Bank of Estonia 
working paper by Karsten Staehr, “Estimates of Employment and Welfare Effects of 
Personal Labour Income Taxation in a Flat-Tax Country: The Case of Estonia.”87 Staehr 
looks at how people react to economic incentives, particularly personal income taxes, in 
the labor market using the 2005 Estonian Labour Force Survey, comprised of 
approximately 16,500 working age individuals, about 8,000 of which are active in the 
labor market. Latvia’s labor participation decision was also examined. Due to a lack of 
data, there is no labor supply analysis on Lithuania. The only household or individual 
level information for Lithuania was proprietary. Therefore, the discussion regarding 
Lithuania is general, examining macroeconomic indicators such as GDP and tax 
revenues.  
The discussion of the flat tax in each of the Baltic countries is heavily weighted 
towards Estonia. This is for a variety of reasons. Firstly, there is significantly more 
information available about its early years after gaining independence in general. The 
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prime minister of Estonia at the time, Mart Laar, wrote both a book as well as articles 
about Estonia’s experience since gaining independence in general and its experience with 
the flat tax in particular, and this does not exist for Latvia and Lithuania. While there are 
accounts of various parts of the transitional years available from a variety of sources on 
these countries, there is not information available as comprehensive as that for Estonia.  
Additionally, when reaching out to contacts in each of the Baltic states, people 
from Estonia were generally more responsive. After contacting the directors of every 
major research institute in Estonia, Latvia, and Lithuania, three people were forthcoming 
with information from Estonia, while two from Latvia were and only one from Lithuania 
was. Finally, the only analysis completed on the effect of the flat tax in any of the Baltic 
states was on Estonia. Therefore, when looking at the Baltic states on a country by 
country level, the analysis is really weighted towards Estonia. Even though Latvia and 
Lithuania are discussed on an individual level, these countries are really used to look at 
the Baltic states on an aggregate level and compare them with other former Soviet Union 
countries. 
The aggregate analysis, focusing on the effect of the flat tax across a group of 
countries is conducted using several methods. The effect on revenue and GDP is analyzed 
by the World Bank using a “differences-in-differences” method. A fixed effect regression 
was also used to examine the effect on GDP, growth and inflation. The effect on equity, 
or extent of income redistribution was conducted by examining Gini coefficients. This 
analysis, conducted by Salman Zaidi of the World Bank, compares Gini coefficients 
across time, across countries, and before and after tax payments. The discussion on 
compliance and simplicity is mainly based on anecdotal and descriptive evidence, with 
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the exception of a case study of Russia conducted by IKK, since these measures are by 
nature difficult to measure and quantify.  
A major difficulty with the analysis on the flat tax is data aggregation. In general, 
data for the early 1990s in transitional economies is inconsistent and unreliable, as those 
economies had a limited state apparatus and resources for recording information. This 
was particularly apparent in aggregating personal income tax revenue information, which 
was of greatest relevance for an analysis on the flat tax. The only available information 
that consistently provided personal income tax revenue information starting before 1994 
was personal income tax as a percentage of GDP. This was the greatest challenge when 
looking at aggregate information, particularly when conducting a cross country analysis.  
When looking at individual countries, the aggregation of labor supply data posed a 
challenge. Even though household level data was available for Latvia, it yielded peculiar 
results in which people worked less as their wages increased. This suggested that there 
was something wrong with the dataset, either in measurement techniques or sampling. 
Thus, overall, the greatest challenge in examining the flat tax lies in the empirical 
analysis. 
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The Case of Estonia 
Background 
Estonia, located on the eastern coast of the Baltic Sea, borders Latvia to the south, 
Russia to the East, and Finland across the sea. Its territory is 45,226 square kilometers 
and had a population of approximately 1.34 million at the beginning of January 2007.88 It 
declared its independence from Germany in 1918 and was occupied by the Soviet Union 
in 1940.89 When Estonia received its independence from the Soviet Union in 1991, its 
economy was devastated. Life under communist rule caused serious setbacks to the 
country’s growth. While Estonians enjoyed a similar standard of living to its neighbor 
Finland prior to communist rule in 1939, by 1987, Estonia’s growth domestic product 
was about $2000 per capita, compared to Finland’s of $14,370.90 Any hopes that the 
removal of communism would revitalize the economy were challenged soon after 
Estonia’s independence. 
In 1992, industrial production declined by more than 30 percent – a decline more 
severe than the Great Depression – price inflation ran at more than 1,000 percent, and 
fuel prices rose by more than 10,000 percent. Estonia, completely dependent on Russia, 
which accounted for 92 percent of Estonian trade, had little to offer the foreign markets. 
Stores in Estonia were empty, and bread and dairy products were rationed as people stood 
in lines to buy food.91 As inflation increased – prices increased twenty-two fold between 
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1991 and 1992 – banks ran out of money to distribute salaries and pensions.92 In March 
1992, completely depleted of the Estonian currency, the town of Tartu introduced its own 
currency, which was printed on the back of old Soviet ration coupons.93  
 Looking into a bleak future, Estonians saw the need for change and on July 6, 
1992, the Estonian Supreme Council decided that the first democratic elections since 
World War II should be held on September 20, 1992.94 The newly elected government 
was led by Pro Patria Union, a radical reform-minded right of center party, composed of 
smaller right-wing parties.95 Of the 680,044 citizens entered in the electoral register, 
458,052 or 67.8 percent voted, and the Pro Patria coalition received 22 percent of the 
votes.96 After no presidential candidate won a majority during the first round of elections, 
Lennart Meri, the Pro Patria candidate, won the presidential elections in the second 
round. Pro Patria then named Mart Laar its candidate for Prime Minister. Laar, who 
began his term as prime minister at the age of 32 years old, proceeded to build a coalition 
in the Riigikogu, the Estonian parliament. On October 19, the Riigikogu authorized Laar 
to form the Government of the Republic.97 
 
Mart Laar, the Architect of Estonia’s Economic Reforms 
Laar, who served as the Estonian prime minister from 1992 to 1994 and 1999 to 
2002 saw Estonias’s emergence from communism as an opportunity to reform. Looking 
to Lescek Balcerowicz, the designer of the Polish economic reformation, Laar noted that 
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a radical economic program, launched as quickly as possible, had a better chance of 
success than several prolonged measures.98 Balcerowicz’s theory was based on the 
assumption that domestic liberalization and freedom from foreign domination create a 
mass psychology in which the people in which the people are more likely to consider 
major changes than in a normal situation. This mass psychology allows the opportunity 
for major political reforms.99 Thus, Laar saw a short window of opportunity, during 
which, radical reforms had to be passed in order to ensure their success.100 He noted that 
transitional economies that do not utilize this time of “extraordinary politics” would greet 
less favorable economic conditions going forward.101  
Thus, Laar immediately set forth with a series of economic reforms. Considering 
the lack of resources and small time frame he saw available, Laar wanted the reforms to 
be as simple as possible.102 His first goal was macroeconomic stabilization. Monetary 
reform in Estonia had begun prior to Laar’s election with the Estonian kroon introduced 
in June 1992 as the national currency.103 Using a currency board system, the kroon was 
pegged to the German mark, the Deutsche mark, at one German mark for eight kroons.104 
The Deutsche mark was a strong currency, and the kroon began to create confidence in 
the Estonian economy.105  
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The next step in macroeconomic stabilization was balancing the budget, which 
required major cuts in subsidies as well as reducing the size of the government.106 These 
changes included the cutting of subsidies for state-owned companies, which led to the 
development of private companies.107 All endowments and subsidies were cut first, 
followed by restrictions were placed on internal costs and ministry investments.108 
Though the International Monetary Fund offered a loan to balance the budget, Laar and 
the Estonian parliament refused, choosing to “build the future of Estonia on the 
momentum for radical reforms, not loans.”109 After several months, the Estonian 
parliament succeeded in balancing the budget and presented the balance budget to the 
Riigikogu on December 14, 1992.110 From that point on the parliament required that only 
a balanced budget could be presented to the Estonian parliament.111  
 Laar noted that essential to the success of the reforms was changing the attitude of 
the Estonian people. He said that many “had to be shaken free of the illusion…that 
somehow somebody else would solve their problems for them.”112 Laar said that under 
the Soviet Union, people were not used to taking initiatives or assuming risks and that the 
people needed to be energized and take responsibility for themselves.113 Cutting subsidies 
to state owned industries gave those of the Soviet mentality the message that they needed 
to begin working in order to succeed.114  
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 By 1993, the inflation rate dropped to 89.8 percent from 1,000 percent in 1992. 
By 1995, it reached 29 percent. Trade began to look westward and exports grew 
rapidly.115 With what Laar considered the first stages of reform, monetary reform and 
macroeconomic stabilization, he began the second stage of reforms. One of the next steps 
Estonia took in its reforms was opening its economy to world markets, reducing trade 
tariffs and non-trade barriers and abolishing export restriction, with nearly all export 
restrictions were removed by 1992.116 The free trade policy increased competition, 
growth, and reconstruction, ultimately bringing Estonia new companies, which opened 
export oriented factories.117 Estonia refused aid during this time, looking to free trade as a 
way to increase foreign direct investment and growth.118  
The final major economic reform that occurred in the early transition years was 
privatization. The government eliminated all state banks, implemented property reform, 
and privatized the economy.119 The development of a legal order created a favorable 
environment for a market economy to develop, for foreign investment to take place, and 
to combat corruption.120 The first laws of property reform were passed in early 1992, 
focusing on returning nationalized or confiscated property to the original legal owners.121 
When returning property was not possible, people were given privatization vouchers as 
compensation. The privatization vouchers allowed people to purchase minority shares of 
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privatized companies or land. By the end of May 1994, about 50 percent of state-owned 
businesses or enterprises were transferred into private ownership or control.122  
 
The Flat Tax 
 On January 1, 1994, Estonia introduced a flat-rate personal income tax of 26 
percent, thereby becoming the first European country to adopt a flat personal income 
tax.123 Previously, Estonia followed a progressive tax system with the top personal 
income tax rate in 1993 held at 33 percent.124 The former system included a personal 
income tax, a corporate income tax, and a value added tax. Social security benefits were 
funded by a 20 percent payroll tax.125  
The implementation of the flat tax was done almost entirely on Laar’s personal 
initiative.126 In explaining his motivation for the flat tax introduction, Laar argued that in 
order to achieve a favorable business environment, limiting regulation was not enough.127 
He claimed that people’s enthusiasm towards starting new companies declined 
considerably when realizing “the tax system punished success”128 and said that Estonia 
needed a tax system that favored saving and investment.129 His objectives were to 
implement a system that was simple, inexpensive to apply, and was as transparent and 
understandable as possible.130 As a transitional economy with a weak state apparatus, 
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Laar explained that Estonia would face major challenges implementing and collecting 
revenues complex, Western-like model tax system. He wanted a tax system to have as 
broad a base and as few exemptions as possible so that there would be a minimized 
incentive to avoid tax payments. He also noted that tax rates should be low in order to 
encourage activity in the economy.131  
However, initially seen as a radical measure, the idea of a flat tax did not receive a 
lot of support initially.132 At the beginning stages, international advisers and local 
bureaucracy both opposed the flat tax, arguing that it would not work, and that if it did, it 
would destroy the “pillars of society.”133 Facing a tight state budget, Ministry of 
Financial Affairs officials thought the idea was very risky.134 When the government 
proposed the bill of the new Income Tax Act to the Riigikogu on September 13, 1993, it 
faced several heated debates. Finally a compromised was reached with the bill’s 
opponents, and on December 8, 1993, the Riigikogu passed the new Income Tax Act and 
established a 26 percent income tax for both businesses and people.135 Even once the act 
was passed, however, people were opposed to it as well.136  
The flat tax reform took place concurrently with other fiscal reforms. Estonia 
entered into agreements with several countries, including Finland, Sweden, and Germany 
in order to improve co-operation between national tax boards and avoid double taxation 
between countries. Additionally excise duties were increased. This increase, however, led 
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to a great deal of alcohol and tobacco smuggling, which ultimately lost the state hundreds 
of millions of kroons.137  
The flat tax remained in place when Pro Patria government was voted out of 
government one year after the reform, in 1995, one year after the reform, and has 
remained in place throughout different ruling parties and coalitions until today.138 Its 
overall framework has remained intact, though exemptions and rates have fluctuated. 
Additionally, there has been a pension reform, which changed the allocation of social tax 
revenue as well as an introduction of compulsory unemployment insurance.139 The two 
parties that have been proponents of the flat tax since the beginning of discussions are the 
Pro Patria and Estonia reform parties.140 There has been some opposition to the flat tax 
from the left wing Estonian Centre Party, which made it a general point in the past three 
elections. However, so far the Central Party has been willing to drop this in return for a 
chance to join the coalition, demonstrating that those who oppose the flat tax do not place 
replacing the tax very high on their agenda.141  
 
Estonia’s Tax System 
 Estonia’s tax system consists of an income tax, a value added tax, excise taxes, 
and a social tax. There are also a few taxes set by local governments, including land tax 
and sales tax, but the share of these taxes is negligible in overall taxation.142 The benefit 
system is also largely national, with municipalities providing a few small local 
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benefits.143 The personal income tax operates on a flat rate, which began at 26 percent in 
1994 and has gradually been decreased to 21 percent.144 Along with the personal income 
tax, there is a basic allowance, currently 2,250 EEK, as well as an increased basic 
allowance in the case of children, a pension allowance, and a sickness allowance. These 
allowances can be deducted from a person’s income during the taxation period. In 
addition to the allowances, there are several tax deductions, which include compulsory 
unemployment insurance contribution payments, housing loan interest payments, and 
training expenses.145 Estonia’s government revenue comprises about one third of its total 
GDP.146  
 
External Influences 
In the early years of Estonia’s transition, there were a number of sources that 
helped shape Laar and the early government’s thinking about reforms. Think-tanks from 
abroad, such as the Heritage Foundation, the International Republican Institute, and the 
Adam Smith Institute147 in addition to the newly formed local Estonian think-tanks, 
served as one influencing. These think tanks organized events at which most of the 
reform agenda was presented and discussed.148 Additionally, though Laar did not adopt 
specific recommendations from large foreign entities, he did look to the principles of 
international institutions such as the World Bank, the IMF, and EC Phare programme.149  
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Additionally, Estonia looked to other transition countries’ experiences when 
creating and implementing its reforms, with West Germany serving as a major source of 
influence. The June 20 date of Estonia’s currency reform purposely coincided that of 
West Germany’s forty-four years earlier. 150 Laar was a Christian democrat, familiar with 
the work of Erhardt and other West German thinkers, and he and the other reformers 
looked to West Germany when implementing his reforms in Estonia.151 Such principles 
Laar looked to included monetary stability, free market entry, the institution of private 
property, and a liberal economic policy, with limited intervention in economic affairs.152 
A feature of West Germany that played an important role in Estonia’s development was 
to carry out economic reforms rather than create a welfare state.153  
However, the closest examples were those in Eastern and Central Europe. The 
Polish reform consisted of balancing the public sector budget, limited central bank 
financing, and economic policies lined to income policies and fixed exchange rates.154 
The goal was to create an economy with private ownership, free markets, and integration 
into the world markets.155 Laar studied the Polish economy, noting its successes such as 
shock therapy, and mistakes, such as the lack of institutional reform.156 Laar also looked 
to Hungary’s abolition of special advantages given to foreign investments, the Czech 
Republic’s privatization, and East Germany’s establishment of separate agencies to assist 
privatization.157  
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With regard to the flat tax specifically, Laar looked to Milton Friedman, who 
proposed a proportional income tax when creating its tax reform.158 The only other 
models of a flat tax for Laar to examine were in Jersey, Guernsey, and Hong Kong.159 
Laar does in fact point to Hong Kong, which implemented a 15 percent flat personal 
income tax in 1947, and the success of the flat tax there when promoting Estonia’s tax 
structure.160 Laar saw Estonia as “the Hong Kong of Europe,” according to Karsten 
Staehr, Professor of International and Public Finance and banking and Chair of Finance 
and Banking at Tallinn University of Technology in Estonia.161 Staehr explained that 
Laar drew a comparison based on China’s proximity to Russia but contact and 
relationship with the rest of the world.162  
 
Evaluation of Estonia’s Flat Tax System 
Personal income tax, general government revenue, and GDP have increased since 
the adoption of a flat tax. However, the revenue increase has not been consistent, and the 
revenue and GDP figures alone do not indicate any conclusive impact of the flat tax. 
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Chart 1. Estonia GDP (1993 – 2007) 
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 (a) GDP is in constant prices with 2000 serving as the base year. 
Source:  International Monetary Fund, World Economic Outlook Database, October 2008 
 
Chart 2a. Personal Income Tax Revenue in 
Estonia During the Early Years of the Flat 
Tax  
Chart 2b. Total Government Revenue in 
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Source:  Recent economic developments, IMF; Stepanyan, p. 16; International Monetary Fund, Tax Reform in the Baltics, Russia, and 
Other Countries of the Former Soviet Union, 1999, p. 3. 
 
 Additionally, as measured by simplicity Estonia’s tax system has demonstrated 
signs of success. Anecdotally, there is a perception that overall people support the tax 
system, it is seen as fair, and there is a general belief that compliance has increased.163 
Filing returns can be done in about 10 to 15 minutes, and 84 percent of people file 
online.164 There were several macroeconomic indicators to indicate economic 
improvement since January 1, 1994, although it is difficult to isolate the effect of the flat 
tax. Staehr said that the simplicity, clarity and transparency of the system allowed 
economic occur, but the tax system is now what turned the country around. “Estonia got a 
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tax system that was fairly transparent so it didn’t stand in the way for the economy 
turning around,” Staehr said.165  
The most comprehensive analysis completed on Estonia’s taxation system is 
presented in a Bank of Estonia working paper by Karsten Staehr, “Estimates of 
Employment and Welfare Effects of Personal Labour Income Taxation in a Flat-Tax 
Country: The Case of Estonia.”166 Staehr looks at how people react to economic 
incentives in the labor market. Staehr uses the 2005 Estonian Labour Force Survey, 
comprised of approximately 16,500 working age individuals, about 8,000 of which are 
active in the labor market to examine the employment and welfare effects of personal 
labor income taxation.  
Staehr first distinguishes between the extensive decision of whether or not to 
participate in the labor force and the intensive decision of how many hours to work. He 
looks at people from across income groups and evaluates how a change in tax rates 
affects both their decision to participate in the labor force and how much labor to supply 
if they are participating.167 The average tax rate affects the extensive decision of whether 
or not to work at all, while the marginal tax rate affects the intensive margin of how many 
hours to work.168 He examines labor force participation as a decision between other uses 
of time and working.169 The Estonian Labor Force Survey provides information only on 
labor force participation, not hours worked. The number of hours worked are determined 
as a function of the hourly after-tax return on employment and other variables.170  
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The first stage in his analysis is to create a function that predicts individual’s 
income as a function of individual characteristics such as age, gender, ethnicity, and 
education. He estimates the log of hourly labor income171 and uses this to predict the pay 
for all of the individuals in the same, including the approximate 1,600 people who 
reported not having an income when they were active in the labor market and the 600 
people who were not working.172 Staehr suggests that the low predicted average hourly 
rate (about 19.5 EEK per hour) may be a reason for non-participation in the work 
force.173  
The next part of Staehr’s analysis is his examination individuals’ labor supply. 
Staehr does this using Heckman’s selection model.174 His analysis shows that different 
factors determine participation versus hours supplied in the labor market.175 The labor 
supply depends on the log after-tax pay as well as other characteristics such as age, 
gender, and education.176 He also looks at labor supply across different income groups 
based on their hourly income: low, middle-low, middle-high, and high.177 As in the 
general case, the hourly after-tax wage affects the labor participation positively.178 The 
labor elasticities are significant for labor participation but not for the intensive margin, 
indicating that after-tax income does not affect the hours individuals work in a 
meaningful way.179 This must be considered, however, along with the fact, that the 
                                                 
171 The log function is used when measuring growth because the difference of two log functions gives the 
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172 Ibid, pp. 21-23. 
173 Ibid, p. 23. 
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concentration of hours spent working in the labor survey were at 0 and 40 hours a week, 
since most people do not work part time.180 The labor elasticities found are generally in 
line with those found in other studies.181  
Staehr’s analysis, particularly that of elasticities of labor supply, has a number of 
implications for Estonia’s tax system. He suggests that tax rates affect participation in the 
labor market, while has only a negligible effect on working hours of those already active 
in the labor force.182 He includes several assumptions in his discussions. One assumption 
is that individuals will react the same way whether the change in after-tax income is from 
taxes or another factor. A second assumption is that tax rate changes affect only labor 
supply and not other factors such as income prior to taxes. Thirdly, it is assumed that 
there is a long enough time horizon that any response in labor supply can take place.183 
The fourth assumption is that the analysis is constrained by the lack of information on the 
behavior and income sources of non-working individuals.184 A change in the personal 
income tax affects labor supply by affecting the average tax rate. Finally, lack of 
information forces Staehr not to include certain tax exemptions.185 
Staehr conducts two different tax policy experiments to look at effect on labor 
supply. In the first experiment, the basic exemption is reduced from 1700 EEK to 1530 
EEK per month. The low and middle group decreased their employment substantially, 
while the high income group was less affected and has a relatively low labor participation 
elasticity. The total employment decreases by 0.48 percentage point.186 In the second 
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experiment, Staehr increases the tax rate by 1 percentage point so that average post-tax 
hourly income decreases the most for those in the high income group.187 However, the 
greatest increases in employment are found in the middle income groups because they 
have higher labor elasticities. In this experiment, total employment decreased by 0.36 
percentage points.188 Both of these experiments suggest that tax changes have sizeable 
effects, which are basically comparable between the experiments.189 The first experiment, 
however, has the greatest effect among the low income group, while the second has the 
greatest effect among the middle groups.  
The final step in Staehr’s analysis is the examination of the marginal cost of 
public funds (MCPF) from raising personal income taxes.190 The marginal cost of public 
funds is a measure of the cost to the private sector from a marginal increase in tax 
revenue.191 It is essentially the money lost to society from employers not employing and 
employees providing labor at the socially efficient point and is measured by 1 plus the 
amount of initial tax revenue displaced per 1 EEK generated.192 The MCPF in his 
analysis is about 4.7 for the low income group, 4.3 for the middle-low income group, 2.3 
for the middle-high income group, and 1.3 for the high income group.193 These results 
make sense, since for a low income worker, in order to raise an additional 1 EEK of 
revenue, the income tax pressure must be raised significantly, which lowers employment 
and decreases initial tax revenue. For a high income worker, it would not require as much 
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income tax pressure to raise 1 EEK of revenue and high income workers are less 
responsive to a change in taxes.194  
Table 3. The Marginal Cost of Public Funds, Two Different Tax Policies 
 Low 
Middle-
low 
Middle-
high High 
Full 
sample
(a)
 
Baseline      
Basic exemption lowered 4.65 4.28 2.30 1.34 1.83 
Tax rate increased 4.65 4.28 2.30 1.34 1.62 
      
Excluding pension contributions      
Basic exemption lowered 1.56 1.58 1.38 1.15 1.28 
Tax rate increased 1.56 1.58 1.38 1.15 1.23 
      
Including value added tax      
Basic exemption lowered 18.24 108.11 3.74 1.49 2.45 
Tax rate increased 18.24 108.11 3.74 1.49 1.99 
(a) Full sample results are calculated using weights of each sub-sample. 
(b) The starting point is a basic exemption equal to 1700 EEK and a tax rate equal to 24%. 
Source:  Staehr, p. 38 
 
Staehr’s paper is the first to consider the welfare cost of taxation in Estonia and 
one of the few that quantify the welfare effect of taxation for transitional countries. It 
looks at the labor elasticity, or labor responsiveness, to a change in the marginal tax rate. 
Labor elasticity is relevant to the flat tax since the idea of taxation is that at higher levels 
it disincentives people from working. Therefore, the government would want to tax 
people who are less responsive to the tax in order to eliminate the loss to society from 
people not working, and tax the people who are more responsive to a tax less, since they 
will provide labor regardless. Staehr’s analysis shows that low income individuals are the 
most responsive to a change in tax rate. Therefore, taxing low income individuals will 
cause them to stop working while the high income group will generally continue to work. 
Given this information, it would be more efficient to have a more progressive tax where 
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the low income people are taxed less and the higher income are taxed more. Therefore, 
Staehr’s findings indicate that the current Estonian flat tax is inefficient in that more 
revenue may be achieved by taxing the higher income people more and the lower income 
people less.  
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The Case of Latvia 
Background 
 Located in between Estonia and Lithuania, Latvia has a population of 
approximately 2.23 million.195 Its geography is strategically important, as the capitals of 
both Estonia and Lithuania are within a few hour drive, and Latvia serves as a transport 
route between Russia and western Europe.196 Its main sources of foreign direct 
investment are nearby countries, primarily Germany, Sweden, Denmark, Finland, and 
Estonia.197 Latvia initially gained its independence after the first World War but was 
occupied again in World War II and then became part of the Soviet Union.198 Although 
Latvia emerged independent from the Soviet Union in 1991, it was deeply embedded in 
the planned economy. The conditions in newly independent Latvia were dismal, with an 
annual inflation rate of more than 900 percent in 1992.199  
Like Estonia, Latvia chose a “shock therapy” model of reform, which included 
rapidly transitioning to a market economy while simultaneously implementing legislative 
change.200 Reforms in Latvia began as early as early 1991 when state regulations were 
removed from retail price setting. Monetary reforms began in 1992, with the introduction 
of the Latvian rubble as a temporary currency on May 7. Soviet rubble circulation was 
stopped on June 20, 1992.201 By 1993, people began to gain confidence in the markets the 
when the currency was stabilized. Foreign trade had already begun to be directed to the 
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west, and the exports to Russia and other eastern ports were beginning to decline.202 
Through controlling the money supply, the Bank of Latvia brought inflation down to 2.6 
percent in December 1992 kept it at less than 3 percent a month through the following 
December. In 1993, the annual inflation rate was reduced to 35, and it reached 28 percent 
in 1994.203  
On March 5, 1993, the second stage of Latvian monetary reform began with the 
introduction of the lats (1 lats = 200 rubles). The lats was pegged to the Special Drawing 
Rights, which is a basket of currencies in the IMF’s unit of account.204 The currency 
reform led to macroeconomic stabilization, a stabilized exchange rate, and a reduction of 
inflation relatively quickly. However, the reform also led to a banking crisis, since many 
banks attracted depositers with high interest rates, hoping inflation would remain high. In 
1995, several commercial banks either went bankrupt or suspended operations.205  
 Latvia also engaged in privatization during the early 1990s. This occurred at a 
slower pace than expected given Latvia’s experience with a private economy prior to 
World War II. By mid-October 1993, only nineteen out of more than 2,000 state-run 
businesses were privatized, and an agency charged in charge of privatizing industry was 
established only in November 1993.206 A main reason for this was because the Latvian 
government attempted to honor the claims of former owners or their descendants to 
regain property, and the right to make these claims was upheld until the end of 1993.207 
Thus, while retail and services, small manufacturing and agricultural enterprises engaged 
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in rapid privatization in the early 1990s, Privatization of large state enterprises and 
apartments, however, did not begin until the mid 1990s and occurred at a much slower 
pace, with most large industries not privatized until 1999.208  
During the 1990s the economic structure of Latvia changed as well. In 1990, 
manufacturing comprised the greatest percentage of GDP, accounting for 35.6 percent. In 
2001, services accounted for 70.4 percent of GDP with manufacturing accounting for 
about 20. Transport of oil accounted for the main growth item in the service sector, while 
manufacturing declined largely because of the close of big industrial enterprises.209 
Latvia also executed strict budgetary control to bring inflation down.210  
 
The Flat Tax 
 A main reason for the flat tax was to increase the simplicity of tax administration. 
Prior to the flat tax implementation, Latvia was operating a tax system, enacted in 1991, 
with five rates ranging between 15 and 35 percent.211 Like in Estonia, the reforms of the 
early 1990s took place rapidly, and there was little room to discuss long term change.212 
Additionally, like the other reforms in Latvia, the flat tax reflected the sentiment that now 
that Latvia was free of excessive government intervention, people wanted to move in the 
opposite direction.213 People became “eager…radical political ideas,” according to one 
source who was there at the time, and “passionately believed in it.” In 1994, the personal 
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income tax rate was set at 25 percent, with the top marginal tax rate of 35 percent. In 
1997, the 25 percent rate was fixed for all levels of income.214 
 Unlike in Estonia, the flat tax was not widely debated in Latvia.215 Professor 
George Viksnins of Georgetown University, who served as senior advisor to the Latvian 
Central Bank from 1992 until 2006, said that there was not a large public reaction.216 The 
people “just adjusted,” according to Raita Karnite, a researcher at Institute of Economics, 
Latvian Academy of Sciences..217 She said that Social Democrats wanted a differentiated 
tax structure, but they composed only a small part of decision makers.218 Viksnins 
attributed the lack of debate to the fact that so much of people’s income was received in 
the informal economy. He explained that generally people’s salary was composed of the 
formal income, which was taxable, and the “envelop money.” Since envelop money was 
negotiated with the employer and given informally and secretly, it was untaxed. Viksnins 
argued that people did not debate tax rates because if they were too high, people would 
“put more [of their salary] in the envelop.”219 Karnite also said that an argument for the 
flat tax was that under a progressive tax, people who earned more were more likely to 
hide their incomes.220  
 The flat tax is still not under serious public debate in Latvia; the main discussions 
revolve around the size of the tax, which since its implementation has been reduced to 25 
percent.221 The idea of moving away from the flat tax has generally not been discussed in 
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public forums.222 However, some individuals express discontent with the tax system. One 
individual who works for a bank in Latvia but wishes to remain unnamed due to political 
sensitivity, argues that the tax system has “undermined [growth] in a very dangerous 
way.” He said that although simplicity may have helped tax collections to an extent, most 
statements made about the flat tax are unfounded. He said that lower tax rates would 
make collection easier independent of the flat tax. He believes that people in the 90s had 
“childhood trauma” or socialism and state intervention, which had caused those opposed 
to the flat tax to be stigmatized. This person believes that now that there is an economic 
crisis, where Latvia and other flat tax countries are suffering, and progressive tax 
countries surviving, people will be able to challenge the basis and idea of a flat tax.  
 
Influences 
 Like Estonia, Latvia was able to look to different countries and there were 
external influences that played a role in the decision to make a flat tax. Latvia received 
advice from international organizations, particularly the European Union, since Latvia 
was trying to integrate into the EU at the time.223 Latvia’s government also consulted 
with German tax specialists on the value added tax as well as consultants from Denmark. 
Karnite said that research institutes did not play a role, as there were no economic 
research institutes, and the economic research in universities mostly dealt with 
education.224  
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Latvian Tax System 
In 1994, the “Law on Personal Income Tax” established a 25 percent income tax 
rate on all levels of annual income225 except for a 10 percent tax on the highest income, 
which was eliminated in 1997.226 Thus, the adoption of the flat tax caused the marginal 
and average tax rates to increase for those with the highest levels of income. In 1995, 
“The Law on Value Added Tax” set forth a 19 percent value added taxes. Some product 
groups, such as newspapers and magazines, received a reduced 5 percent value added 
tax.227 In 2004, the corporate tax rate was reduced from 35 percent to 15 percent,228 
becoming one of the lowest in the EU.229 
Evaluation of Latvia tax System 
 There have been no formal studies from the government or in universities on the 
effect of the flat tax in Latvia. Since the flat tax, Latvia has seen overall a consistent 
increase in GDP. However, this does not serve as any indication of the success of the flat 
tax, only that the flat tax did not impediment to economic growth. 
Chart 3. Latvia GDP (1992 – 2007) 
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 (a) GDP is in constant prices with 2000 serving as the base year. 
Source:  International Monetary Fund, World Economic Outlook Database, October 2008 
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Looking at other macroeconomic indicators, there is also no conclusive indication of an 
impact of the flat tax on personal income tax revenue, government revenue, or GDP. 
While revenues have increased during this time, they also fell during some years, and it is 
difficult to attribute an increase in revenues to the flat tax.  
Chart 4a. Personal Income Tax Revenue 
in Latvia During the Early Years of the 
Flat Tax  
Chart 4b. Total Government Revenue in 
Latvia During the Early Years of the Flat 
Tax 
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Source:  Recent economic developments, IMF; Stepanyan, p. 16; International Monetary Fund, Tax Reform in the Baltics, Russia, and 
Other Countries of the Former Soviet Union, 1999, p. 3. 
 
 
The effect of the flat tax on labor supply in Latvia was also examined. This 
analysis was done using data from the World Bank’s Household Expenditure and Income 
Data for Transitional Economies (HEIDE).230 The dataset contains household and 
individual level data for people in Latvia from 1997 to 1998 and was analyzed data for 
the male household heads. The information used in the analysis included gender, age, 
education, labor force participation (employed or not working), wages, non-labor income, 
and number of children (under the age of 14). Not working individuals included both 
those who are unemployed and inactive, and only individuals above the age of 25 were 
used in the analysis. Those who identified themselves as self-employed to be counted as 
                                                 
230 This analysis was completed with the assistance of Dr. Flavio Cunha, Assistant Professor of Economics, 
University of Pennsylvania. A full description of the analysis is included in Appendix X.  
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employed and their income from self-employment was counted as part of their wages. In 
this situation  
The first step in the analysis is to estimate the wage one would receive based on 
age and education. However, the problem with this estimation is that wages in the dataset 
are only for those employed, creating a selection problem. The people who are already in 
the workforce have certain characteristics and made certain decisions that enabled them 
to work and these will be reflected in the wages they receive. Therefore, the labor force 
participation should be taken into account as a factor in the wages instead of assuming 
that unemployed people would receive comparable wages to those employed. Therefore, 
in order to estimate, β for the wage in such a way, a Heckman selection model is used 
(Table 4).231 
The “select” component of the table shows the coefficients, or effect, of 
independent variables (age, education, non-labor income, and number of children) on the 
decision to work. Using this information, the “wagey” component of the table shows the 
effect of the variables age and education on wage received. Using these coefficients, the 
potential wage for non-working people can be predicted. Using the new wage for 
unemployed people found through the Heckman selection model, a probit232 regression is 
used to predict the effect of wage on labor force participation. 
 
                                                 
231 The Heckman selection model used to account for selection bias. This occurs when the independent 
variables depend on unmeasured variables, which also impact the independent variable. Here, the wages in 
the model are just for those who are working, which presents a bias in the wage data. Therefore, the 
regresion first models whether or not one is employed. Then, using this information, it models what the 
wage would be based on different factors. 
232 A probit regression is a nonlinear regression model designed for binary dependent variables. (Stock and 
Watson, 389) In this case, the dependent variable was binary with the outcomes unemployment = 0 and 
unemployment = 1. Each coefficient given by the probit regression gives the expected change in the 
probability that Y (labor force status) = 1. (Stock and Watson, 391) 
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Table 4. Heckman Selection Model: The Effect of Age and Education on Wage 
  Coef. Std. Err. z P>|z| 95% Conf. Interval 
Wagey AGE 3.899 2.727 1.43 0.153 -1.447 9.244 
 AGE2 -0.031 0.032 -0.99 0.325 -0.093 0.031 
 Educat 54.130 4.138 13.08 0.000 46.020 62.240 
 _cons -86.847 61.436 -1.41 0.157 -207.260 33.566 
        
Select AGE 0.165 0.018 9.07 0.000 0.129 0.200 
 AGE2 -0.002 0.000 -12.04 0.000 -0.003 -0.002 
 Educat 0.268 0.028 9.48 0.000 0.213 0.324 
 NONLABORY -0.002 0.000 -5.82 0.000 -0.003 -0.001 
 CHILDN 0.068 0.034 1.97 0.049 0.000 0.135 
 _cons -2.547 0.445 -5.73 0.000 -3.419 -1.676 
        
 /athrho -0.155 0.081 -1.90 0.057 -0.314 0.005 
 /lnsigma 4.970 0.017 293.15 0.000 4.936 5.003 
        
 Rho -0.153 0.079 -0.30 0.005   
 Sigma 143.971 2.441 139.27 148.835   
 Lambda -22.086 11.558 -44.74 0.568   
 
Source:  HEIDE Database, The World Bank, 1997-98 
 
 
Table 5. Probit Regression: The Effect of Wage, Education, and Children on Labor Force 
Participation 
Lfs Coef. Std. Err. z P>|z| 95% Conf. Interval 
WAGEITAX -0.001 0.000 -3.71 0.000 -0.002 -0.001 
Educat 0.464 0.026 17.52 0.000 0.412 0.516 
CHILDN 0.425 0.029 14.65 0.000 0.368 0.482 
_cons -1.049 0.066 -15.9 0.000 -1.178 -0.920 
 
Source:  HEIDE Database, The World Bank, 1997-98 
 
Looking at the probit regression there is a negative coefficient on wage in the 
probit regression. The negative coefficient on age is not what economic theory would 
predicts; a negative coefficient on wage indicates that as wage increases, people are less 
likely to work. There are a number of possibilities for why this outcome would occur for 
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the analysis. One reason is that the data itself is inaccurate: people reported inaccurately 
or it was transcribed and input inaccurately. A second possibility is that the labor force 
composition in transitional economies is unique in that the older generation was educated 
in a communist country while the younger generation was educated in a democratic, 
capitalist country. This could cause the older generation, who receive higher wages (this 
is indicated through the Heckman analysis) to be less useful in the new economy and 
therefore employed less. 
 A third possibility is that those who earn the highest wages will enter the informal 
economy. This is particularly relevant since the data is from 1997 to 1998. In 1997, the 
10 percent tax on income for those in the highest tax bracket was eliminated, causing all 
levels of income to be taxed at 25 percent.233 As George Viksnins of Georgetown 
University explained, people did not debate tax rates because if they were too high, 
people would receive more of their salary informally, either through the informal sector 
or untaxed income. Thus, this analysis suggests that it is possible the flat tax actually 
caused increased involvement in the underground economy. If this is the case, then the 
flat tax in Latvia may have had a negative impact on the formal economy. 
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The Case of Lithuania 
 
Background  
 The largest and most populated Baltic state, Lithuania is located to the south of 
Latvia and also shares borders with Belarus, Poland, and Russia.234 Lithuania is a home 
to 3.4 million citizens, 67 percent of which live in urban areas.235 After losing its 
independence to the Soviet Union in World War II, Lithuania re-established it in March 
1990, thereby becoming the first Soviet republic to declare independence.236 Like the 
other Baltic states, Lithuania faced a dismal economic situation upon gaining its 
independence. During its early years after independence, more than 90 percent of 
Lithuania’s trade was with the rest of the former Soviet Union and it operated an 
inefficient industrial sector.237 Between 1991 and 1993, Lithuania’s industrial output 
dropped by half and faced an even sharper decline in agricultural production.238 Inflation, 
increased from 225 percent in 1991 to 1,100 percent in 1992, while wages dropped by 30 
percent that year.239 
Thus, soon after gaining independence, Lithuania underwent a series of reforms. 
Among these was a privatization reform. In 1991, the Law on Initial Privatization of State 
Property was passed, and from 1991 to 1995 Lithuania enacted a voucher privatization 
program, which restored agricultural land to former owners and provided former 
collective farm workers land. It also moved housing from state to private ownership and 
transferred ownership of small and medium enterprises from state to private ownership 
Between 1992 and 1994, Lithuania saw rapid privatization especially for small 
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businesses, farms and houses, and by November 1994, more than 5,000 enterprises had 
been privatized.240 The voucher privatization generated nearly Lt 150 million in proceeds 
(more than US$40 million), most of which were received by State Privatization Fund.241 
Another major reform undertaken in Lithuania was monetary reform. On June 25, 1993, 
the central bank introduced the litas as the national currency, which became the sole form 
of tender that August. It was pegged at the US dollar.242  
At the beginning of its independence, Lithuania had hundreds of different types of 
taxes, which served as its main sources of budget revenues. At the beginning of the 
transition, however, budget revenues fell, as activity moved to the private sector and 
“hidden” economies.243 In 1992, Lithuania saw its lowest revenue collection, when tax 
revenue fell to 26 percent. Yet even in 1992, Lithuania was beginning to see a 
turnaround. That year, Lithuania’s inflation rate was reduced and lessened every each 
year since. Since then, revenues have ranged between 27.5 and 32.5 percent of GDP, and 
the country saw positive economic growth every year beginning in 1995.244  
Among the changes that led to such outcomes in the early years of Lithuania’s 
transition was a decrease in expenditure of Lithuania’s general government budget.245 
Lithuania’s constitution was written at the beginning of the transition period. It defined 
the fundamental elements of the Lithuanian public expenditure system as well as a state 
and municipal budget. Thus from the beginning of independence, there was a unified 
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state budget.246 Since independence, the government and parliament set a high priority 
towards staying within the approved budget deficit, and the government has tried to 
reduce the budget deficit in order to decrease inflation and contain the buildup of foreign 
debt. Expenditures were decreased to 32.5 percent in 1994, 31.8 percent in1995, and 30.5 
percent in 1996 as the government began to consolidate financial resources. Between 
1994 and 1997, progress was made in reducing the budget deficit, with the fiscal deficit 
declining to 1.8 percent of GDP in 1997.247  
Another tool used to finance the budget deficit was treasury bills. In 1994, 
Lithuania created a domestic treasury bills market, in 1995, a one-year treasury bond was 
issued, and in 1998 two-year bonds were issued. From 1994 to 1997, more than one-third 
of all bills were sold to foreign investors, and domestic treasury bills financed 65 percent 
of the central government deficit in 1994 alone. Since 1994, the Lithuanian government 
has focused on foreign financing of its debt. Within just a year, the central government 
was able to increase foreign financing by more than 2.5 times and reduce domestic 
financing. By 1997, the stock of treasury bills comprised almost 7 percent of GDP. This 
strategy marked a change in Lithuania’s financing since, until 1995, international 
financial institutions such as the IMF, World Bank, and EBRD were the main sources of 
external finance. However, since 1995, the Lithuanian government has been able to 
access international capital markets, and in 1995 alone, $60 million were borrowed 
through private Eurobond placements. By 1996, foreign commercial borrowing and bond 
issues comprised 88 percent of overall debt financing.248  
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The Flat Tax 
Fiscal policy was also included in changes made in Lithuania. In 1991, upon 
independence, Lithuania implemented a progressive tax system with tax rates ranging 
between 18 and 33 percent. In 1994, the government set a fixed flat tax rate of 33 
percent.249 However, according to Jonas Cicinskas, Lithuania had really seen a flat tax 
system since the Soviet Union, which imposed a flat personal income tax of 13 percent 
across the USSR. A flat personal income tax was the natural tax structure for the early 
years of Lithuania’s independence Cicinskas explained. With a rapid pace of reforms and 
precarious economic situation in Lithuania’s early years, discussions regarding taxes did 
not attract a great deal of attention.250   
 
Other Tax Reforms  
Among the tax reforms introduced in the 1990s was the introduction of the 
general turnover tax and then the VAT in 1994.251 The main motivation behind these 
indirect taxes was to adopt a market-friendly tax system that was compatible with EU 
requirements and to meet revenue needs. The share of indirect taxes, such as the VAT 
and customs tax has been increasing this year. In practice it is easier to administer 
indirect taxes than direct income taxes, and these taxes have contributed a large share of 
state budget revenues.252 The VAT was introduced at 18 percent, and its share of the 
national budget has risen from 29.5% in 1994 to 40% in 1998. Revenues from the excise 
                                                 
249 Stepanyan, Vahram. Reforming Tax Systems: Experience of the Baltics, Russia, and Other Countries of 
the Former Soviet Union, p. 27. 
250 Jonas Cicinskas, phone interview, March 19, 2009. 
251 Vaicenavicius, p. 202. 
252 Ibid. 
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tax grew as well, going from accounting for 1.1% of GDP in 1994 to 3.1 percent in 1998. 
It has a specific rate, therefore taking inflation into account.253 As opposed to the 
implementation of indirect taxes, where a major motivating force was meeting EU 
requirements, the creation of direct taxes was primarily internally driven. In 1993, direct 
taxes accounted in the national budget accounted for 11 percent of GDP.254 By 1998, this 
figure had dropped to 7 percent. Currently, Lithuania has a 24 percent personal income 
tax rate and a 15 percent corporate tax rate.255  
Another element to tax reform was a change in tax administration. In the 1990s, 
the share of economic activity in shadow economy had reached 40 percent demonstrating 
a need to improve tax administration and have more equitable distribution of the tax 
burden.256 A reform in tax administration accompanied the changes in tax law. In 1995, a 
tax administration law was passed by parliament, which established the Central Tax 
office in accordance with European Union requirements. The administrative reforms 
were aimed at reducing the number of local offices and increasing efficiency.257 From 
1995 to1996, the central office of the State Tax Inspectorate, established to be distinct 
from the Ministry of Finance, reorganized local tax offices according to function. By 
1999, the State Tax Inspectorate established ten local district offices instead of 56.258 
 
 
 
                                                 
253 Ibid. 
254 Ibid. 
255 KPMG, pp. 53, 74. 
256 Ibid. 
257 Ibid. 
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Effect 
Lithuania introduced a 33 percent flat tax rate, which was the highest personal 
income tax rate the country had seen prior to reform, and tax revenues increased 
subsequently.259 However, like in the case of Estonia and Latvia, it is difficult to 
conclude an effect of the flat tax on revenues since other reforms occurred 
simultaneously. Additionally, personal income tax revenues dropped to pre-reform levels 
the year and there was no consistent increase of personal income or total government 
revenues. 
 
Chart 5a. Personal Income Tax Revenue in 
Lithuania During the Early Years of the 
Flat Tax  
Chart 5b. Total Government Revenue in 
Lithuania During the Early Years of the 
Flat Tax 
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Source:  Recent economic developments, IMF; Stepanyan, p. 16; International Monetary Fund, Tax Reform in the Baltics, Russia, and 
Other Countries of the Former Soviet Union, 1999 
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Chart 6. Lithuania GDP (1992 – 2007) 
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 (a) GDP is in constant prices with 2000 serving as the base year. 
Source:  International Monetary Fund, World Economic Outlook Database, October 2008 
 
Furthermore, there are years when GDP is increasing yet personal income tax revenues as 
a percent of GDP are falling. Looking at absolute revenue, Lithuania has, with the 
exception of 1995 seen an increase. However, the database whether this information if at 
constant or current prices.  
Chart 7. Personal Income Tax Revenue in Lithuania 
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Source:  World Tax Database, Ross School of Business, University of Michigan 
 
Lithuania also maintains the highest tax rate compared to its peers, which would 
theoretically reduce compliance. Since the payoff from evading is higher, there would be 
a greater incentive structure to evade taxes.260 The major challenge in analyzing the effect 
                                                 
260 “Lithuania – Economics Reforms.” U.S. Library of Congress. 
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of the flat tax in Lithuania is the absence of non-proprietary household or individual level 
information. Therefore, Lithuania is used to help understand the development of the flat 
tax, but the specific effect on Lithuania is difficult to examine. However, Lithuania can 
be used in aggregate, cross-country analyses in order to compare it to non-flat tax 
countries.  
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Overall Findings of the Flat Tax: Aggregate Analysis 
 
Revenue and Growth Effects 
 
Proponents of the flat tax claim that a flat tax would provide increased incentives 
to work, leading to increased entrepreneurial activity and national output.261 However, 
looking at the Baltic states, it is unclear if a flat tax yielded this effect. Since the flat tax 
implementations, the Baltic states did greet increased personal income tax revenue 
growth, both over time and in relation to other former Soviet Union countries. By 2000, 
Estonia and Lithuania saw personal income tax revenue comprising almost 8 percent of 
GDP.262 All three of the states had similar or higher levels of revenue as the beginning of 
the transition process.263  
Table 6. The Baltic States’ Personal Income Tax Revenue in Comparison to Other Former 
Soviet Union Countries (% GDP) 
 1992 1993 1994 1995 1996 1997 1998 1999 2000 
Estonia 7.0  8.2  7.9  8.7  8.3  8.1  8.5  8.7  7.8  
Latvia 2.7  3.6  4.6  5.1  5.4  3.8  4.4  4.7  4.3  
Lithuania 5.7  5.0  5.4  5.4  6.6  5.1  8.0  8.5  7.8  
   Average 5.1  5.6  6.0  6.4  6.8  5.7  7.0  7.3  6.6  
Armenia - 1.6  1.2  1.3  1.3  1.8  1.6  1.9  1.4  
Azerbaijan - 2.4  1.5  1.1  1.6  2.1  2.5  2.7  - 
Georgia - 0.2  0.3  0.6  0.8  1.1  1.7  1.9  1.8  
Kazakhstan 2.5  2.4  1.8  2.0  2.2  2.4  1.7  1.8  2.0  
Kyrgyz Republic - 1.3  1.9  1.8  1.2  1.0  1.2  1.1  1.3  
Moldova 1.8  1.6  1.7  2.5  2.5  2.8  2.2  1.6  1.5  
Ukraine - 2.0  3.0  2.9  3.3  3.5  3.5  3.4  3.8  
Uzbekistan 2.5  2.8  2.6  2.8  3.6  4.0  4.0  4.1  3.6  
Tajikistan - - - - 1.1  1.2  1.0  1.1  1.2  
Russia 3.5  2.8  2.9  3.1  3.1  3.1  3.3  3.4  3.2  
   Average 2.6  1.9  1.9  2.0  2.1  2.3  2.3  2.3  2.2  
Source:  Recent economic developments, IMF; Stepanyan, p. 16 
 
                                                 
261 Explained in theory section of thesis (see pp--) 
262 Stepanyan, Vahram. “Reforming Tax Systems: Experience of the Baltics, Russia, and Other Countries 
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 The World Bank conducted a differences-in-differences estimation to analyze the 
effect of flat tax reform on tax compliance, administration, and revenue generation.264 
This type of analysis involves looking at a group of countries, which includes both those 
who enacted the flat tax reform (the treatment group) and those that did not (the control 
group).265 Looking at the outcomes of all the countries over time, the analysis helps 
determine the effect of the treatment, or flat tax reform, on the countries who received 
it.266 The results of this regression of a flat tax on revenue are not statistically significant 
and therefore do not indicate an increase or decrease of revenues as a result of the flat tax 
implementation.267 Real wage increase was the only variable significant at a 10 percent 
confidence level.268 There were also inconclusive results for the effect of a change in 
corporate income tax revenues.269  
  The effects of the flat tax on GDP and GDP growth were additionally examined 
using a fixed effect regression analysis.270 This analysis also yielded inconclusive results. 
A fixed effect regression analyzes the effect of something that occurs in each state but 
varies across time, in this case the flat tax implementation. The analysis on the effect of 
the flat tax on constant GDP yielded significant positive results at the 95 percent 
                                                 
264 Saavedra, Pablo. “Flat Income Tax Reforms,” in Fiscal Policy and Economic Growth: Lessons for 
Eastern Europe and Central Asia, p. 273. 
265 Ibid. 
266 Ibid, p. 274. 
267 Ibid, p. 275. 
268 A 10 percent confidence level means that the chances of attaining the result if the result were inaccurate 
did not have any effect is below 10 percent. Inaccurate here would mean that the independent variable (flat 
tax) actually did not have an effect on the dependent variable (real wage increase).  If the chances of 
attaining this result, given that the result is inaccurate, is below a certain threshold (here, 10 percent), the 
result is said to be "statistically significant at the 10% level." In this case, the only result that was found to 
be "statistically significant at the 10% level" was real wage increase. 
269 Saavedra, p. 275. 
270 This analysis was completed with the assistance of Flavio Cunha, Assistant Professor of Economics, 
University of Pennsylvania.  
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confidence level. However the analysis on the effect of the flat tax on the natural log271 of 
GDP did not yield statistically significant results. The effects of a flat tax on growth were 
also not significant at the 95 percent level. 
 A fixed effect regression was also used to examine the effect of flat taxes on 
inflation, with the idea being inflation is a signal for poor economic growth. If there is a 
lack of growth and revenues in the economy, governments will use inflation as a tool to 
raise money. Again, the results were inconclusive. The effect of a flat tax on the average 
consumer prices272 was significant at the 95 percent confidence level. However, this 
yielded a positive affect on inflation. The effect of the flat tax on change in percent 
change of consumer prices273 was not significant at the 95 percent confidence level. 
 
Table 7. Effect of Flat Tax (Independent Variable) 
Dependent 
variable 
Coefficient 
(on flat tax)
(a)
 
Robust 
Standard 
Error t-statistic P-statistic 95% confidence interval 
GDP (constant) 987.881 352.968 2.80 0.006 288.310 1687.453 
Natural log of 
GDP 
-0.030 0.033 -0.91 0.367 -0.096 0.036 
GDP growth rate 0.020 0.014 1.47 0.146 -0.007 0.047 
Average 
consumer prices 
47.569 11.605 4.10 0.000 24.569 70.568 
Percent change 
of consumer 
prices 
119.836 137.980 0.87 0.387 -153.846 393.519 
(a) Flat tax was an independent binary variable with 0 representing years prior to reform, 1 representing year of reform, and years after. 
Source:  Data from International Monetary Fund, World Economic Outlook Database, October 2008, analysis by Deena Greenberg with 
assistance from Flavio Cunha 
 
                                                 
271 Natural log of GDP is a way to measure GDP growth, since a percent change is the difference between 
natural logs. 
272 Average consumer prices are measured by averages for the year. The index is based such that the year 
2000 = 100. (International Monetary Fund, World Economic Outlook Database, October 2008) 
273 Inflation is measured by annual percent change of average consumer prices for each year. (International 
Monetary Fund, World Economic Outlook Database, October 2008)  
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 It is difficult to analyze and draw any conclusions about the effect of the flat tax 
across these countries for several reasons. Given that so many reforms were introduced 
concurrently with the flat tax implementation, it is highly probable that a regression on 
the flat tax will display some effect, regardless of whether or not there actually is 
correlation. Additionally, for many flat tax countries, the reason why they implemented a 
flat tax, among other reforms, was because they had a low level of GDP. Therefore, there 
may be a timing correlation between flat tax implementation and a rise in GDP, but the 
causality could be in reverse.   
The specific revenue effects in the Baltic countries were discussed in the 
preceding chapters. The only other major analysis of a flat tax was in a study on Russia. 
Ivanova, Keen, and Klemm274 looked at the effects of the flat tax on Russia using 
individual and household level data. In the Russian flat tax reform, the low income group, 
which was the larger group, was significantly less affected by the reform than the higher 
income group. Yet, personal income tax revenues fell for all groups except the low 
income group, which was the least affected.275 Therefore, neither the country level nor 
aggregate level evidence indicates that the flat tax is significantly and positively 
correlated with economic growth.  
 
Effects on Labor Supply 
 The overall effect on labor currently seems to be inconclusive. On a theoretical 
level, people will join the labor force if their after tax income compensates them for 
whatever fixed cost goes in to joining the work force and is higher than the benefits 
                                                 
274 Ivanova, Anna; Keen, Michael, and Alexander Klemm. “The Russian Flat Tax Reform.” IMF Working 
Paper, International Monetary Fund, January 2005. 
275 Saavedra, p. 261. 
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received by not participating in the work force.276 An increase in the tax threshold should 
encourage labor force participation since people can earn more and not pay taxes.277 An 
increase in the marginal tax rate could cause people to leave the labor force, as when after 
tax income declines, labor becomes less attractive.278  
One’s labor supply decision is based on how his average tax rate and marginal tax 
rate are affected. If marginal tax rate falls, there is a substitution effect279 towards 
increased labor, since the cost of leisure increases. If average tax rate rises, there will be 
an income effect280 towards increased effort since, when one receives less after tax-
income, the income effect will cause him to work more in order to compensate.281 These 
effects differ significantly at different levels of income.282 On a theoretical level, the 
effect on labor is largely uncertain.283  
The empirical evidence for how a flat tax affects labor supply is limited due to 
lack of available data. Ivanova, Keen, and Klemm examined the effects in Russia using 
household level data. In the Russian flat tax reform, the low income group, which was the 
larger group, was significantly less affected by the reform than the higher income group. 
Ivanova et al. looked at the lower income group as the control group and the higher 
income group as the treatment group and compare behavior between the pre and post tax 
                                                 
276 Keen, Michael; Kim, Yitae, and Ricardo Varsano. “The ‘Flat Tax(es)’: Principles and Evidence,” in 
International Public Finance, p. 731. 
277 Ibid, p. 731. 
278 A detailed framework for evaluating labor force participation decisions can be found in the Latvia 
chapter.  
279 When marginal tax rate falls, after tax income increases. Therefore, the reward received from working 
increases, and the opportunity cost of leisure increases. The substation effect causes someone with 
increased income to spend more time working than on leisure, since leisure becomes more “expensive.” 
280 When marginal tax rate increases, after tax income falls. With decreased income, someone would want 
to work more in order to compensate for the income lost to taxes.  
281 Keen, p. 730. 
282  Ibid. 
283 Ibid. 
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reform periods. Their analysis suggested that there was no evidence for a labor supply 
change. Ivanova et al. did not find that gross income or hours worked increased more 
among the treatment group. They also found that the only group that did show a 
significant increase was the control group.284  
 
Equity 
On a theoretical level, it is not clear whether a flat or progressive tax system is 
more equitable in the sense of redistributing income from high to low income 
individuals.285 Pre-tax income, Y, is assumed to be independent of the tax schedule, 
meaning people’s salary does not depend on the tax structure in place. A tax system ‘A’ 
is assumed to be more progressive than a tax system ‘B’ if it has a more unequal 
distribution of tax payments; it is more progressive if the low income people pay a 
smaller share of all tax payments under A than B.286 This model assumes that both tax 
systems raise the same revenue and focuses purely on equality. 
In the case of the Baltic countries, there is a tax free level of income, which is 
greater under the flat tax than the progressive tax, meaning there was an increase in the 
threshold before which one was taxed under the flat tax reforms.287 In this case, the low 
income individuals are paying less tax under the new flat tax structure than the preceding 
progressive tax system.288 If the flat tax structure provides a higher minimum tax 
threshold, there are two possible outcomes. In the first case, the flat tax rate is at least as 
high as the highest pre-reform marginal tax rate. Therefore, the tax schedules cross only 
                                                 
284 Keen, p. 732. 
285 Ibid, p. 719. 
286 Ibid, p. 722. 
287 Ibid, p. 723. 
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once (see figure 1).289 This situation is comparable to what occurred in Latvia and 
Lithuania after their flat tax reforms.290 It is an unambiguously more progressive system 
in the sense that on the low income side, fewer people have to pay taxes as the threshold 
increases, and on the higher income side, the tax rate remains the same. Therefore, the 
lower income people pay an overall lower share of total tax payments under the flat tax 
system. 
 
The second situation is that the flat tax lies in between the high and low ends of 
the pre-reform tax levels. In this scenario the tax schedules cross twice (see figure 2). 
This situation is comparable to what occurred under the Estonian reform.291 In this case it 
is ambiguous which tax system is more progressive because the lower income people are 
                                                 
289 Ibid. 
290 Keen, p. 724. 
291 Ibid. 
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paying fewer taxes than under the previous structure, but the higher income group also 
pays a lower tax rate than it did before.292 It is unclear whether or not the low income 
people pay a smaller share of the total tax payments under the new flat tax system.  
Therefore, with regard to redistribution of income, on a theoretical level, the higher the 
marginal tax rate of the flat tax, the less inequality there will be in after-tax income.293  
 
 
 
The effects of flat taxes on income redistribution empirically have also been 
inconclusive. In “Main Drivers of Income Inequality in Central European and Baltic 
Countries – Some Insights from Recent Household Survey Data,” Salman Zaidi examines 
indicators and causes of inequality in the EU8 countries, Poland, Hungary, Slovenia, 
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Slovakia, the Czech Republic, Latvia, Lithuania, and Estonia.294 He uses data from the 
2006 European Union Survey of Income and Living Conditions and data from the EU 
SILC study to examine the Gini coefficients295 of the EU8. The Gini coefficients are used 
as a metric to measure income inequality in the different countries. 
  
  Table 8. Gini coefficient for income per capita 
  
Country 
 
1987-90  1993-94  1996-99  2006 
Czech Republic   0.19    0.23    0.25    0.27  
Estonia   0.24    0.35    0.37    0.35  
Hungary   0.21    0.23    0.25    0.34  
Latvia   0.24    0.31    0.32    0.40  
Lithunia   0.23    0.33    0.34    0.37  
Poland   0.28    0.28    0.33    0.33  
Slovakia   -    -    -    0.30  
Slovenia   0.22    0.29    0.25    0.26  
         Source:  Salman Zaidi, p. 7, 2006 World Bank staff calculations based on data from 2006 EU-SILC 
 
The Baltic states, which adopted the flat tax between 1994 and 1995, show the 
greatest income inequality overall and the Gini coefficient in fact increases since the 
adoption of the flat tax.296 While this alone does not conclude that flat taxes are less 
equitable, it certainly does not make the case that a flat tax helps alleviate income 
inequality. In looking at Zaidi’s analysis, however, one must also realize that it is difficult 
to look at long term Gini coefficient trends for countries, since countries often change the 
household surveys used to aggregate information. Gini coefficients are highly sensitive to 
such changes, and thus, long term comparisons should be seen only as broader estimates. 
                                                 
294 Zaidi, Salman. “Main Drivers of Income Inequality in Central European and Baltic Countries.” 
Washington DC: The World Bank, 2009, p. 4. 
295 A measure of income inequality for a country ranging from 0 to 1, with 0 being total equality (everyone 
has the same income) and 1 being total inequality (1 person has all of the income, while everyone else has 
no income) 
296 Ibid, p. 7. 
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Therefore, while it is likely that inequality has risen in the Baltic states since the adoption 
of the flat tax, it is questionable whether this rise is as large as what the numbers suggest. 
Zaidi also looks at the difference between pre tax and post tax Gini coefficients to 
examine how much the tax is able to redistribute income.297  
Table 9. Gini Coefficient of Income Inequality 
Country 
Pre-tax-benefit 
incomes 
Post tax 
incomes 
Difference in pre/ 
post tax Ginis 
Ratio of pre/ 
post tax Ginis 
Czech Republic 0.485  0.340  0.145  1.426  
Slovakia 0.474  0.339  0.135  1.398  
Hungary 0.568  0.429  0.139  1.324  
Lithuania 0.540  0.413  0.127  1.308  
Slovenia 0.471  0.369  0.102  1.276  
Estonia 0.499  0.391  0.108  1.276  
Poland 0.558  0.440  0.118  1.268  
     
 
Source:  Salman Zaidi, p. 13, 2006 World Bank staff calculations based on data from 2006 EU-SILC 
 
Looking at the ratio between pre and post tax reforms, Estonia and Lithuania had 
ratios of 1.28 and 1.31, which suggests that the flat tax has some redistributive effect on 
overall income distribution. The higher the ratio is, the more redistribution is taking 
place. This redistributive effect in the Baltic countries is comparable (in the middle for 
Lithuania and on the lower end for Estonia) with the redistributive effect of the tax 
schemes of the other EU8 countries. Thus, no definitive statement can be made as to the 
exact redistributive effect of the flat tax, although it appears as though the flat tax has a 
comparable redistribution to progressive tax countries. There is also no evidence from 
this analysis that flat tax countries have significantly higher inequality overall than 
                                                 
297 Latvia is excluded from this analysis because the EU-SILC dataset does not provide data on gross 
incomes (pre tax data). This analysis looks purely on effect on income distribution and does not take into 
account other effects of taxation such as those on efficiency and labor output. Zaidi, p. 13. 
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progressive tax countries, an argument frequently used by opponents of the flat tax. This 
is the case when the Baltic countries are compared to both the EU8 countries and EU15. 
Chart 8. Gini Coefficients in European Countries 
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Studies have been conducted examining the income distribution effects of a flat 
tax in the Slovak Republic. The Slovak Republic implemented a tax reform in 2004, 
which included a 19 percent flat personal income tax, replacing a 10-38 percent rate 
schedule. The reform also included an increase in deductions and tax credits. A World 
Bank report examining the distributional impacts of these reforms found that the majority 
of household saw increased disposable incomes. The households that saw disposable 
income decline were those with more than two children where all adults were 
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unemployed, and therefore saw more benefits before the reform.298 The study also found 
that overall poverty decreased, suggesting that the personal income tax reform did have a 
positive effect on alleviating inequity.299 While this case study, like the discussion on the 
Gini coefficients above, does not indicate a strong redistributive effect of the flat tax, it 
does serve as one counterargument to the claim that the flat tax increases inequality. 
 
Simplicity and Compliance  
The flat tax, marketed as the “postcard” reform, purports to make tax payments 
significantly simpler. This simplicity may in fact be the strongest reason for a transitional 
economy to adopt a flat tax. While the claims of increased growth and equity are not yet 
substantiated in theory or practice, the flat tax does create a simpler system. Tax returns 
can be filed in less than fifteen minutes300 and most deductions and exemptions have been 
removed. The system, overall, is simple. Jonas Cicinskas said that the conversations 
today in Lithuania pay attention not to any complexity of the tax system but to whether or 
not the system can be made more elaborate. Therefore, while it is not clear whether or not 
a flat tax leads to revenue growth or is more equitable, it does create a simpler system.301 
While simplicity alone may not lead to increased growth, without a simple tax 
structure, transitional economies will likely face increased difficulties in revenue 
collection. Karsten Staehr explained that there is some anecdotal evidence from Ukraine 
and Russia that the complexities of tax systems were so extreme that people decided it 
was not worth doing anything. In the mid 1990s, during the Yeltsin era, Russians had so 
                                                 
298 Saavedra , p. 260. 
299 Ibid. 
300 Strossel, John. “Springtime for Taxes.” Townhall.com. 
301 Cicinskas, phone interview, March 19. 2009. 
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much trouble getting tax revenues paid that tax police went out and raided companies, 
even bakeries. Ukraine, as well, faced challenges during the beginning of its transition. 
Looking at income tax revenue, Ukraine and Russia did not grow as much in the early 
1990s. While the flat tax was likely not the only reason for the Baltic states’ success, it 
did not prevent this success from occurring. As Staher explained, “Estonia got a tax 
system that was fairly transparent and easy to handle so it didn’t stand in the way for the 
economy turning around.”302 
Furthermore, simplicity should lead to increased payments due to increased 
compliance, as a simpler tax system makes it easier for citizens to pay taxes. In general, 
the effects of compliance are difficult to measure, as by nature, non-compliance is 
difficult to quantify.303 On a theoretical level, the impact of rates on compliance can 
depend on the type of costs the taxpayer would incur in avoiding payment weighed 
against the money saved from avoiding tax payments.304 Looking at the effect of the flat 
tax across countries that use it, compliance seemed to increase when both the personal 
income tax and corporate income tax were enacted at the same rate.305 States with less 
burdensome tax regimes also showed increased compliance.306 
An analysis of the Russian reform, performed by Ivanova, Keen, and Klemm does 
suggest that compliance improved since flat tax implementation. They compared 
consumption with income reported, assuming people would be more truthful about 
consumption. Looking at ratio of reported income to actual income, Ivanova et al. 
observed that for those affected by the reform, the ratio increased from 52 to 70 
                                                 
302 Staehr, Karsten, phone interview, February 10, 2009.  
303 Keen, p 735. 
304 Ibid, p. 734. 
305 Saavedra, p. 277. 
306 Ibid.  
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percent.307 However, the researchers concluded that the increased compliance could not 
necessarily be attributed to the flat tax, since there were also tax administration 
improvements implemented simultaneously.308 
 
                                                 
307 Keen, p. 735. 
308 Saavedra, p. 261. 
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Conclusions  
In general, the effects of a flat tax are difficult to isolate both on the country and 
aggregate level. In each country, the flat tax was generally accompanied by monetary, 
fiscal, and political reforms. With the exception of Ukraine, the flat tax reforms always 
followed a change in government.309 Additionally, with the exception of Latvia, the tax 
reform included an increase in personal allowances.310 Looking at both the theory and 
data, there is no clear evidence that the flat tax alone improves revenues, labor output, 
growth, or equity. In fact, with regard to redistribution, there is a case to be made that the 
flat tax redistributes income less than a progressive tax system. Furthermore, the case of 
Latvia suggested that the flat tax may actually increase involvement in the underground 
economy. 
Thus, the main argument for the adoption of a flat tax in transitional economies is 
based on its simplicity. Transitional economies, with a newly formed government and 
limited state apparatus, are not as well positioned as their developed counterparts to 
implement a complex tax structure with differentiated levels of taxation. Therefore, the 
main advantage of a flat tax is that it sets in place a system where people can easily pay 
taxes and the government can easily administer taxes.  
Looking at a flat tax in this vein, timing is essential to the reform. As Mart Laar 
noted, a reform launched as quickly as possible had a better chance of success than 
several prolonged measures.311 Drawing on Balcerowicz’s theory, that domestic 
liberalization and freedom from foreign domination create a mass psychology in which 
the people want, more than in a normal situation, to look towards the future and the 
                                                 
309 Keen, p. 739. 
310 Ibid, p. 718. 
311 Laar , “The Estonian Economic Miracle,” p. 2. 
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greater good, Laar noted that radical reforms had to be passed in order to ensure their 
success.312 Thus, perhaps the early implementation of the reforms more than the flat tax 
by itself is what allowed Estonia, Latvia, and Lithuania to become Baltic Tigers, while 
countries who had later implementation did not necessarily greet the same success. 
Furthermore, these tax policies cannot exist in isolation. In every successful case of a flat 
tax, monetary, governmental, and parallel fiscal reforms accompanied.  
Thus, the question of whether or not to implement a flat tax in transitional 
economies cannot be looked at in a vacuum. There is no evidence that the flat tax by 
itself causes increased growth, equity, or compliance on its own. In fact, the analysis on 
the Baltic countries suggests that the flat tax may cause less income redistribution than 
progressive tax countries, and in the case of Latvia compliance may decrease under the 
flat tax. Therefore, while there is no definitive evidence that the flat tax creates growth, 
the simplicity of the flat tax appears to at least allow growth to take place during the early 
years of transition. However, past this period of initial development, there is no 
conclusive evidence that the flat tax is an appropriate model for continued growth.  
 
 
 
                                                 
312 Laar, “The Estonian Economic Miracle,” pp. 2-3. 
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Appendix 1: Flat Taxes Across the World 
 
 
Flat Taxes Across the World 
Flat tax jurisdiction Year enacted Tax rate 
Jersey 1940 20% 
Hong Kong 1947 16% 
Guernsey 1960 20% 
Estonia
(a)
 1994 22% 
Latvia 1995 25% 
Lithuania
(b)
 1996 27% 
Russia 2001 13% 
Serbia 2003 14% 
Slovakia 2004 19% 
Ukraine
(c)
 2004 15% 
Romania 2005 16% 
Georgia  2005 12% 
Iceland 2007 36% 
Mongolia 2007 10% 
Kyrgyzstan 2007 10% 
Macedonia 2007 12% 
Montenengro 2007 15% 
Czech Republic  2008 15% 
Albania 2008 10% 
   
(a) originally 26% 
(b)  originally 33% 
(c) originally 13% 
Source:   
Daniel Mitchell. "Flat World, Flat Taxes." Cato at Liberty, April 27, 2007 
Alvin Rabushka. "The Flat Tax Spreads to the Czech Republic." hoover.org, 27 August 2008 
Daniel Mitchell. "Albania Joins the Flat Tax Club." Cato at Liberty, April 9, 2007 
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Appendix 2: The Analysis of Labor Force Participation in Latvia 
 
Using data from the World Bank’s Household Expenditure and Income Data for 
Transitional Economies (HEIDE), the effect of the flat tax on labor force participation in 
Latvia was estimated. The dataset contains household and individual level data for people 
in Latvia from 1997 to 1998 and was analyzed data for the male household heads. The 
information used in the analysis included gender, age, education, labor force participation 
(employed, unemployed, or inactive), wages, non-labor income, and number of children 
(under the age of 14).313  
 
 The idea behind the analysis is that each individual tries to maximize a utility 
function, which is composed of consumption and leisure.  
uc,P, = c + α1 + 1 − P + α2c1 − P  
 
with c representing consumption and P representing employment, or labor force 
participation. P = 1 if someone is employed and 0 if someone is unemployed (those who 
are inactive are discarding from the analysis). Epsilon (ε) is a shock that causes someone 
to decide whether or not to work, it can be though of as disutility from labor, and α1 α2 
are parameters. 
Consumption is attained by taxable labor income (w) and non-labor income (y). The tax 
rate on wages, is represented by τ. This is represented by the function: 
 
c = y + P1 − τw
 
 
Substituting consumption (c) into the original utility function, the utility for someone 
unemployed is (P=0) represented by 
 
uc, 0, = α1 + 1 − P + 1 + α2y   
 
and the utility for someone employed (P =1 ) is represented by  
 
uc, 1, = y + P1 − τw
 
 
If someone is employed, their utility from employment is greater than their utility from 
being employed is greater than being unemployed  
uc, 1, ≥ uc, 0,
 
     and 
 
y + P1 − τw ≥ α1 + 1 − P + 1 + α2y  
                                                 
313 This analysis was completed with the assistance of Flavio Cunha, Assistant Professor of Economics, 
University of Pennsylvania. 
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Solving this inequality for ε 
≤ 1 − τw − α2y − α1
 equation -1-  
This is the level of shock for anyone who decides to work. Therefore, anyone with a 
shock above this level will decide not to work. These equations can help understand the 
decision of whether or not to work and how tax rate affects it. However, those who are 
unemployed do not have information on wages, since they are not working. Therefore, 
wages are estimated using the equation  
    
w = xβ + η
 equation -2-  
x is a variable that contains the variables age and education as well as a constant, and η is 
a shock that would cause someone’s wage to change.  
However, the problem with this estimation is that wages are only for those employed, 
creating a selection problem. The people who are already in the workforce have certain 
characteristics and made certain decisions that enabled them to work and these will be 
reflected in the wages they receive. Therefore, the labor force participation should be 
taken into account as a factor in the wages instead of assuming that unemployed people 
would receive comparable wages to those employed. Therefore, in order to estimate, β 
for the wage in such a way, a Heckman selection model is used.314 
 
                                                 
314 The Heckman selection model used to account for selection bias. This occurs when the independent 
variables depend on unmeasured variables, which also impact the independent variable. Here, the wages in 
the model are just for those who are working, which presents a bias in the wage data. Therefore, the 
regresion first models whether or not one is employed. Then, using this information, it models what the 
wage would be based on different factors. 
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Heckman Selection Model: The Effect of Age and Education on Wage 
  Coef. Std. Err. z P>|z| 95% Conf. Interval 
wagey AGE 3.899 2.727 1.43 0.153 -1.447 9.244 
 AGE2 -0.031 0.032 -0.99 0.325 -0.093 0.031 
 educat 54.130 4.138 13.08 0.000 46.020 62.240 
 _cons -86.847 61.436 -1.41 0.157 -207.260 33.566 
        
select AGE 0.165 0.018 9.07 0.000 0.129 0.200 
 AGE2 -0.002 0.000 -12.04 0.000 -0.003 -0.002 
 educat 0.268 0.028 9.48 0.000 0.213 0.324 
 NONLABORY -0.002 0.000 -5.82 0.000 -0.003 -0.001 
 CHILDN 0.068 0.034 1.97 0.049 0.000 0.135 
 _cons -2.547 0.445 -5.73 0.000 -3.419 -1.676 
        
 /athrho -0.155 0.081 -1.90 0.057 -0.314 0.005 
 /lnsigma 4.970 0.017 293.15 0.000 4.936 5.003 
        
 rho -0.153 0.079 -0.30 0.005   
 sigma 143.971 2.441 139.27 148.835   
 lambda -22.086 11.558 -44.74 0.568   
 
Source:  HEIDE Database, The World Bank, 1997-98 
 
 
 
After using the Heckman model to find the wage for unemployed people, a probit315 
regression is used to predict the effect of wage on labor force participation. First, 
equation -2- is placed into equation -1- (in place of w in equation 1), 
 − 1 − τη≤ 1 − τxβ − α2y − α1
 
and 
 
 − 1 − τη≤ 1 − τxβ − α2γ − α1
 
letting  
 − 1 − τη = υ
 
then  
                                                 
315 A probit regression is a nonlinear regression model designed for binary dependent variables. (Stock and 
Watson, 389) In this case, the dependent variable was binary with the outcomes unemployment = 0 and 
unemployment = 1. Each coefficient given by the probit regression gives the expected change in the 
probability that Y (labor force status) = 1. (Stock and Watson, 391) 
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υ≤ 1 − τxβ − α2y − α1
equation -3- 
If ε and η are normally distributed,316 represented by 

η
~N
0
0
,
σ2
ση
ση
ση2
 
 
Then  
υ =  − 1 − τη~N0,σ2 − 2ση1 − τ + 1 − τ2ση2  
 
In this equation, we are defining, the variance of ν to be 
 
συ2 = σ2 − 2ση1 − τ + 1 − τ2ση2  
 
Therefore,  
υ
συ ~N0, 1  is normally distributed 
Going back to equation 3, we can divide both sides by 
συ  
 
υ
συ ≤
1−τxβ−α2y−α1
συ  equation -4- 
 
Therefore, the probability that someone works is found by finding the normal distribution 
in equation 4.317 
 
PrP = 1 = Pr υσυ ≤
1−τxβ−α2γ−α1
συ
= Φ υσυ ≤
1−τxβ−α2γ−α1
συ
 
 
However, in order to find what  
1−τxβ−α2γ−α1
συ  is, the variables in the equation need 
to be found. We know τ, the tax rate is 25% is Latvia. Therefore, the variables 
                                                 
316 Something normally distributed means that it has a bell shaped distribution. Something that has a 
standard normal distribution has a normal distribution with a mean 0, and a variance of 1, denoted N(0,1) 
317 Random variables with the N(0,1) distribution, denoted by Z, have a cumulative distribution function 
denoted by Φ. Therefore, the probability that Z<c = Φ(c) (Stock and Watson, 39). 
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β
συ ,
α2
συ ,
α1
συ can be estimated using a probit regression. This will give the effect of 
wage on labor participation.  
 
Probit Regression: The Effect of Wage, Education, and Children on Labor Force 
Participation 
lfs Coef. Std. Err. z P>|z| 95% Conf. Interval 
WAGEITAX -0.001 0.000 -3.71 0.000 -0.002 -0.001 
educat 0.464 0.026 17.52 0.000 0.412 0.516 
CHILDN 0.425 0.029 14.65 0.000 0.368 0.482 
_cons -1.049 0.066 -15.9 0.000 -1.178 -0.920 
 
Source:  HEIDE Database, The World Bank, 1997-98 
 
 
 
 
 
 
  ___  ____  ____  ____  ____ tm 
 /__    /   ____/   /   ____/ 
___/   /   /___/   /   /___/   10.1   Copyright 1984-2008 
  Statistics/Data Analysis            StataCorp 
                                      4905 Lakeway Drive 
                                      College Station, Texas 77845 USA 
                                      800-STATA-PC        http://www.stata.com 
                                      979-696-4600        stata@stata.com 
                                      979-696-4601 (fax) 
 
34-student Stata for Windows (network) perpetual license: 
       Serial number:  1910516915 
         Licensed to:  Chris Sabella 
                       Univ of Penn 
 
Notes: 
      1.  (/m# option or -set memory-) 4.88 MB allocated to data 
 
. use C:\Users\krb-user16\AppData\Local\Temp\Temp1_LATHH.ZIP\LATHH.DTA  
 
 
. drop if gender == 2 
(4410 observations deleted) 
 
. drop if AGE < 25 
(86 observations deleted) 
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. replace lfs = 0 if lfs == 3 
(1093 real changes made) 
 
. replace lfs = 0 if lfs == 2 
(185 real changes made) 
 
. gen PITAXAGE = (1-.25)*AGE 
 
. gen PITAXAGE2 = (1-.25)*AGE2 
 
. gen NONLABORY = familyy + totpeny + socassy + unempy + othsocy + pritry + 
othery 
 
. replace wagey = . if lfs == 0 
(1278 real changes made, 1278 to missing) 
 
. heckman wagey AGE AGE2 educa, select(AGE AGE2 educa NONLABORY 
CHILDN) 
 
Iteration 0:   log likelihood = -13531.895   
Iteration 1:   log likelihood = -13527.583   
Iteration 2:   log likelihood = -13527.401   
Iteration 3:   log likelihood =   -13527.4   
 
Heckman selection model                         Number of obs      =      3194 
(regression model with sample selection)        Censored obs       =      1278 
                                                Uncensored obs     =      1916 
 
                                                Wald chi2(3)       =    188.43 
Log likelihood =  -13527.4                      Prob > chi2        =    0.0000 
 
------------------------------------------------------------------------------ 
             |      Coef.   Std. Err.      z    P>|z|     [95% Conf. Interval] 
-------------+---------------------------------------------------------------- 
wagey        | 
         AGE |   3.898506   2.727143     1.43   0.153    -1.446596    9.243608 
        AGE2 |  -.0312363   .0317081    -0.99   0.325    -.0933831    .0309106 
      educat |   54.12978   4.137876    13.08   0.000     46.01969    62.23987 
       _cons |   -86.8468    61.4364    -1.41   0.157    -207.2599    33.56634 
-------------+---------------------------------------------------------------- 
select       | 
         AGE |   .1646233   .0181477     9.07   0.000     .1290544    .2001922 
        AGE2 |  -.0022389   .0001859   -12.04   0.000    -.0026033   -.0018745 
      educat |   .2682636   .0282978     9.48   0.000      .212801    .3237263 
   NONLABORY |  -.0020653   .0003548    -5.82   0.000    -.0027608   -.0013699 
      CHILDN |   .0675066   .0342675     1.97   0.049     .0003436    .1346696 
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       _cons |  -2.547142   .4447073    -5.73   0.000    -3.418752   -1.675531 
-------------+---------------------------------------------------------------- 
     /athrho |  -.1546265   .0813673    -1.90   0.057    -.3141035    .0048504 
    /lnsigma |   4.969613   .0169522   293.15   0.000     4.936387    5.002838 
-------------+---------------------------------------------------------------- 
         rho |  -.1534059   .0794524                     -.3041656    .0048504 
       sigma |   143.9711   2.440623                      139.2662     148.835 
      lambda |  -22.08601   11.55836                     -44.73999    .5679624 
------------------------------------------------------------------------------ 
LR test of indep. eqns. (rho = 0):   chi2(1) =     2.19   Prob > chi2 = 0.1393 
------------------------------------------------------------------------------ 
 
. gen wagecarrot = (3.898506*AGE)+(-.0312363*AGE2)+(54.12978*educa) - 86.8468 if 
l 
> fs == 0 
(1916 missing values generated) 
 
. gen WAGEI = . 
(3194 missing values generated) 
 
. replace WAGEI = wagey if lfs == 1 
(1916 real changes made) 
 
. replace WAGEI = wagecarrot if lfs == 0 
(1278 real changes made) 
 
. gen WAGEITAX = (1-.25)*WAGEI 
 
. prob lfs PITAXAGE PITAXAGE2 WAGEITAX educa CHILDN 
 
Iteration 0:   log likelihood = -2149.7613 
Iteration 1:   log likelihood = -1410.7917 
Iteration 2:   log likelihood = -1320.6277 
Iteration 3:   log likelihood =  -1309.001 
Iteration 4:   log likelihood = -1308.7778 
Iteration 5:   log likelihood = -1308.7777 
 
Probit regression                                 Number of obs   =       3194 
                                                  LR chi2(5)      =    1681.97 
                                                  Prob > chi2     =     0.0000 
Log likelihood = -1308.7777                       Pseudo R2       =     0.3912 
 
------------------------------------------------------------------------------ 
         lfs |      Coef.   Std. Err.      z    P>|z|     [95% Conf. Interval] 
-------------+---------------------------------------------------------------- 
    PITAXAGE |   .2404037   .0242867     9.90   0.000     .1928026    .2880047 
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   PITAXAGE2 |  -.0032573   .0002477   -13.15   0.000    -.0037429   -.0027717 
    WAGEITAX |  -.0008492   .0003251    -2.61   0.009    -.0014864   -.0002119 
      educat |   .2913997   .0312334     9.33   0.000     .2301834     .352616 
      CHILDN |   .0498893   .0340255     1.47   0.143    -.0167994     .116578 
       _cons |  -2.853505   .4460625    -6.40   0.000    -3.727771   -1.979238 
------------------------------------------------------------------------------ 
Note: 10 failures and 0 successes completely determined. 
 
. prob lfs WAGEITAX educa CHILDN 
 
Iteration 0:   log likelihood = -2149.7613 
Iteration 1:   log likelihood = -1816.6116 
Iteration 2:   log likelihood = -1809.9957 
Iteration 3:   log likelihood = -1809.9818 
 
Probit regression                                 Number of obs   =       3194 
                                                  LR chi2(3)      =     679.56 
                                                  Prob > chi2     =     0.0000 
Log likelihood = -1809.9818                       Pseudo R2       =     0.1581 
 
------------------------------------------------------------------------------ 
         lfs |      Coef.   Std. Err.      z    P>|z|     [95% Conf. Interval] 
-------------+---------------------------------------------------------------- 
    WAGEITAX |  -.0010865   .0002929    -3.71   0.000    -.0016607   -.0005124 
      educat |   .4641372   .0264911    17.52   0.000     .4122157    .5160587 
      CHILDN |   .4253114   .0290355    14.65   0.000     .3684028      .48222 
       _cons |  -1.049016   .0659652   -15.90   0.000    -1.178306   -.9197267 
------------------------------------------------------------------------------ 
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Appendix 3: Fixed Effect Regression: The Effect of the Flat Tax on Macroeconomic 
Variables 
 
Independent Variable: The Flat Tax 
Dependent Variables: Constant GDP, the Natural Log of Constant GDP, GDP Growth, 
Average Consumer Prices, and Percent change of Consumer prices 
 
 
  ___  ____  ____  ____  ____ tm 
 /__    /   ____/   /   ____/ 
___/   /   /___/   /   /___/   10.0   Copyright 1984-2007 
  Statistics/Data Analysis            StataCorp 
                                      4905 Lakeway Drive 
                                      College Station, Texas 77845 USA 
                                      800-STATA-PC        http://www.stata.com 
                                      979-696-4600        stata@stata.com 
                                      979-696-4601 (fax) 
 
24-student Stata for Windows (network) perpetual license: 
       Serial number:  1910517433 
         Licensed to:  UPenn Library 
                       UPenn Library 
 
Notes: 
      1.  (/m# option or -set memory-) 1.00 MB allocated to data 
 
. (11 vars, 153 obs pasted into editor) 
gen y91=(year==1991) 
 
. gen y92=(year==1992) 
 
. gen y93=(year==1993) 
 
. gen y94=(year==1994) 
 
. gen y95=(year==1995) 
 
. gen y96=(year==1996) 
 
. gen y97=(year==1997) 
 
. gen y98=(year==1998) 
 
. gen y99=(year==1999) 
 
. gen y00=(year==2000) 
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. gen y01=(year==2001) 
 
. gen y02=(year==2002) 
 
. gen y03=(year==2003) 
 
. gen y04=(year==2004) 
 
. gen y05=(year==2005) 
 
. gen y06=(year==2006) 
 
. gen y07=(year==2007) 
 
. areg gdpconstant d y91 y92 y93 y94 y95 y96 y97 y98 y99 y00 y01 y02 y03 y04 y0 
> 5 y06 y07, absorb (country) robust 
 
Linear regression, absorbing indicators                Number of obs =     135 
                                                       F( 17,   109) =    1.00 
                                                       Prob > F      =  0.4618 
                                                       R-squared     =  0.9678 
                                                       Adj R-squared =  0.9604 
                                                       Root MSE      =  1336.1 
 
------------------------------------------------------------------------------ 
             |               Robust 
 gdpconstant |      Coef.   Std. Err.      t    P>|t|     [95% Conf. Interval] 
-------------+---------------------------------------------------------------- 
           d |   987.8814   352.9682     2.80   0.006       288.31    1687.453 
         y91 |  -738.2672   473.5873    -1.56   0.122    -1676.902    200.3675 
         y92 |  (dropped) 
         y93 |  -446.8312   397.5854    -1.12   0.264    -1234.833    341.1702 
         y94 |  -1072.965   542.0343    -1.98   0.050    -2147.259    1.329748 
         y95 |  -1287.252   611.4006    -2.11   0.038    -2499.028   -75.47554 
         y96 |  -1361.374   679.2993    -2.00   0.048    -2707.723   -15.02473 
         y97 |  -1327.847   653.6942    -2.03   0.045    -2623.447   -32.24601 
         y98 |  -1331.396   715.6017    -1.86   0.066    -2749.696    86.90308 
         y99 |  -1229.528   610.7527    -2.01   0.047     -2440.02   -19.03656 
         y00 |  -1032.862    477.211    -2.16   0.033    -1978.678   -87.04511 
         y01 |  -1023.531   472.5538    -2.17   0.032    -1960.117   -86.94453 
         y02 |  -908.8833    452.294    -2.01   0.047    -1805.315   -12.45128 
         y03 |  -838.4506   472.3306    -1.78   0.079    -1774.595    97.69334 
         y04 |  -859.4514   575.9256    -1.49   0.139    -2000.917    282.0145 
         y05 |  -892.4767   765.9421    -1.17   0.246    -2410.549    625.5956 
         y06 |   -661.332    924.782    -0.72   0.476     -2494.22    1171.556 
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         y07 |  -388.0627   1137.767    -0.34   0.734    -2643.081    1866.955 
       _cons |   3149.629    381.027     8.27   0.000     2394.446    3904.813 
-------------+---------------------------------------------------------------- 
     country |   absorbed                                       (9 categories) 
 
. areg lngdpconstant d y91 y92 y93 y94 y95 y96 y97 y98 y99 y00 y01 y02 y03 y04  
> y05 y06 y07, absorb (country) robust 
 
Linear regression, absorbing indicators                Number of obs =     135 
                                                       F( 17,   109) =   47.73 
                                                       Prob > F      =  0.0000 
                                                       R-squared     =  0.9985 
                                                       Adj R-squared =  0.9982 
                                                       Root MSE      =  .10722 
 
------------------------------------------------------------------------------ 
             |               Robust 
lngdpconst~t |      Coef.   Std. Err.      t    P>|t|     [95% Conf. Interval] 
-------------+---------------------------------------------------------------- 
           d |  -.0300845   .0332009    -0.91   0.367    -.0958875    .0357185 
         y91 |  -.0905873   .1178873    -0.77   0.444    -.3242361    .1430614 
         y92 |  (dropped) 
         y93 |  -.1817699   .1467523    -1.24   0.218    -.4726281    .1090883 
         y94 |  -.2493644   .1282827    -1.94   0.054    -.5036165    .0048877 
         y95 |   -.243105   .1256889    -1.93   0.056    -.4922162    .0060062 
         y96 |   -.219146   .1236687    -1.77   0.079    -.4642533    .0259614 
         y97 |   -.177759   .1210539    -1.47   0.145    -.4176839    .0621659 
         y98 |  -.1454835   .1231075    -1.18   0.240    -.3894786    .0985116 
         y99 |  -.1469642   .1211389    -1.21   0.228    -.3870577    .0931292 
         y00 |  -.0971353   .1205261    -0.81   0.422    -.3360141    .1417436 
         y01 |   -.033733   .1215514    -0.28   0.782    -.2746438    .2071778 
         y02 |   .0203457   .1218449     0.17   0.868    -.2211469    .2618384 
         y03 |   .0935733   .1234979     0.76   0.450    -.1511955    .3383421 
         y04 |   .1755822   .1258539     1.40   0.166    -.0738562    .4250206 
         y05 |   .2497877   .1303868     1.92   0.058    -.0086348    .5082101 
         y06 |   .3312048   .1316378     2.52   0.013      .070303    .5921066 
         y07 |   .4132897   .1320782     3.13   0.002      .151515    .6750643 
       _cons |   5.099774   .1150799    44.32   0.000     4.871689    5.327859 
-------------+---------------------------------------------------------------- 
     country |   absorbed                                       (9 categories) 
 
. areg growthrate d y91 y92 y93 y94 y95 y96 y97 y98 y99 y00 y01 y02 y03 y04 y05 
>  y06 y07, absorb (country) robust 
 
Linear regression, absorbing indicators                Number of obs =     127 
                                                       F( 16, 101)   =       . 
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                                                       Prob > F      = 
                                                       R-squared     =  0.6290 
                                                       Adj R-squared =  0.5372 
                                                       Root MSE      =  .04417 
 
------------------------------------------------------------------------------ 
             |               Robust 
  growthrate |      Coef.   Std. Err.      t    P>|t|     [95% Conf. Interval] 
-------------+---------------------------------------------------------------- 
           d |   .0197955   .0135011     1.47   0.146    -.0069869     .046578 
         y91 |  (dropped) 
         y92 |  -.1518617          .        .       .            .           . 
         y93 |  -.1518149   .0382629    -3.97   0.000    -.2277182   -.0759116 
         y94 |  -.1144721   .0414078    -2.76   0.007    -.1966141   -.0323301 
         y95 |  -.0605896    .024461    -2.48   0.015    -.1091137   -.0120655 
         y96 |  -.0391294     .02087    -1.87   0.064      -.08053    .0022712 
         y97 |  -.0217017    .025896    -0.84   0.404    -.0730725    .0296691 
         y98 |  -.0482351   .0207862    -2.32   0.022    -.0894692    -.007001 
         y99 |  -.0608397   .0199847    -3.04   0.003     -.100484   -.0211954 
         y00 |    -.00953    .019555    -0.49   0.627    -.0483219    .0292618 
         y01 |   -.001499   .0172246    -0.09   0.931     -.035668      .03267 
         y02 |  -.0074798   .0148185    -0.50   0.615    -.0368757    .0219162 
         y03 |   .0061269   .0175393     0.35   0.728    -.0286664    .0409202 
         y04 |   .0071663   .0164627     0.44   0.664    -.0254912    .0398238 
         y05 |  -.0050359   .0163569    -0.31   0.759    -.0374836    .0274118 
         y06 |    .008861   .0155071     0.57   0.569    -.0219009    .0396229 
         y07 |   .0095289   .0166819     0.57   0.569    -.0235635    .0426212 
       _cons |   .0533355   .0150955     3.53   0.001     .0233902    .0832809 
-------------+---------------------------------------------------------------- 
     country |   absorbed                                       (9 categories) 
 
. areg inflationaverageindex  d y91 y92 y93 y94 y95 y96 y97 y98 y99 y00 y01 y02 
>  y03 y04 y05 y06 y07, absorb (country) robust 
 
Linear regression, absorbing indicators                Number of obs =     136 
                                                       F( 17,   110) =   21.33 
                                                       Prob > F      =  0.0000 
                                                       R-squared     =  0.7750 
                                                       Adj R-squared =  0.7238 
                                                       Root MSE      =   37.64 
 
------------------------------------------------------------------------------ 
             |               Robust 
inflationa~x |      Coef.   Std. Err.      t    P>|t|     [95% Conf. Interval] 
-------------+---------------------------------------------------------------- 
           d |    47.5685   11.60544     4.10   0.000     24.56923    70.56776 
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         y91 |  -34.22176   16.55273    -2.07   0.041    -67.02539   -1.418133 
         y92 |  (dropped) 
         y93 |   19.39849   18.58037     1.04   0.299    -17.42344    56.22042 
         y94 |   14.42051   17.53338     0.82   0.413    -20.32654    49.16755 
         y95 |   23.89607   16.16433     1.48   0.142    -8.137839    55.92998 
         y96 |   36.80545    16.9429     2.17   0.032     3.228598    70.38229 
         y97 |   31.98886   20.35601     1.57   0.119    -8.351972     72.3297 
         y98 |   39.43308    19.6419     2.01   0.047     .5074386    78.35873 
         y99 |   52.98786   18.82546     2.81   0.006     15.68023     90.2955 
         y00 |    67.8732   16.62035     4.08   0.000     34.93556    100.8108 
         y01 |    82.7357   14.83566     5.58   0.000     53.33489    112.1365 
         y02 |   94.22681   16.08627     5.86   0.000      62.3476     126.106 
         y03 |    99.5122   17.60557     5.65   0.000      64.6221    134.4023 
         y04 |   100.4205   21.73536     4.62   0.000     57.34615    143.4949 
         y05 |   105.0319   21.14874     4.97   0.000     63.12002    146.9437 
         y06 |    118.898   23.16041     5.13   0.000     72.99948    164.7965 
         y07 |   132.3608   24.40622     5.42   0.000     83.99334    180.7282 
       _cons |   13.45215   12.47747     1.08   0.283    -11.27527    38.17957 
-------------+---------------------------------------------------------------- 
     country |   absorbed                                       (9 categories) 
 
. areg inflationaveragechange d y91 y92 y93 y94 y95 y96 y97 y98 y99 y00 y01 y02 
>  y03 y04 y05 y06 y07, absorb (country) robust 
 
Linear regression, absorbing indicators                Number of obs =     128 
                                                       F( 16, 102)   =       . 
                                                       Prob > F      = 
                                                       R-squared     =  0.4010 
                                                       Adj R-squared =  0.2542 
                                                       Root MSE      =  371.98 
 
------------------------------------------------------------------------------ 
             |               Robust 
inflationa~e |      Coef.   Std. Err.      t    P>|t|     [95% Conf. Interval] 
-------------+---------------------------------------------------------------- 
           d |   119.8364   137.9799     0.87   0.387    -153.8461    393.5188 
         y91 |  (dropped) 
         y92 |     49.265          .        .       .            .           . 
         y93 |   1087.898   798.6037     1.36   0.176    -496.1283    2671.925 
         y94 |   3.960492   108.7713     0.04   0.971    -211.7869    219.7079 
         y95 |    -118.61   86.94411    -1.36   0.176    -291.0632    53.84321 
         y96 |  -192.9846   91.22635    -2.12   0.037    -373.9317    -12.0376 
         y97 |  -199.1093   100.1973    -1.99   0.050    -397.8501   -.3684249 
         y98 |  -209.4179   92.30642    -2.27   0.025    -392.5072   -26.32855 
         y99 |  -200.9527   91.87995    -2.19   0.031    -383.1961   -18.70924 
         y00 |  -205.7827   91.16781    -2.26   0.026    -386.6136   -24.95175 
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         y01 |  -219.9058   96.53944    -2.28   0.025    -411.3913    -28.4203 
         y02 |  -231.8868   96.18664    -2.41   0.018    -422.6726   -41.10108 
         y03 |  -246.4525   103.2111    -2.39   0.019    -451.1713   -41.73372 
         y04 |  -272.7276   121.3908    -2.25   0.027    -513.5057   -31.94949 
         y05 |  -298.0695   142.9483    -2.09   0.040    -581.6068    -14.5321 
         y06 |  -299.2742    143.096    -2.09   0.039    -583.1045   -15.44402 
         y07 |  -299.1732   143.1783    -2.09   0.039    -583.1668   -15.17973 
       _cons |   185.1668   84.90502     2.18   0.031     16.75812    353.5755 
-------------+---------------------------------------------------------------- 
     country |   absorbed                                       (9 categories) 
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